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In 1952, the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency (DCRLA)
announced a sweeping plan to clear and redevelop the southwest quadrant of
the nation's capitol. Max Morris and Goldie Schneider were two business
owners affected by the proposal. Schneider operated a successful hardware
store that had been in the family for decades; Morris owned a department store.
The agency, which had designated the area as "blighted," planned to acquire
their buildings, demolish them, and transfer the cleared land to the Bush
Construction Company. Schneider and Morris, however, refused to sell.' To
prevent the government from taking their properties by eminent domain, they
filed suit, alleging that taking their buildings would violate the Public Use
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states
"nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation. ' '2 Their claims would wind their way to the United States
Supreme Court, which concluded in the 1954 case of Berman v. Parker that the
condemnations were constitutional.
The DCRLA's victory, which set the stage for a nation-wide expansion of
the urban renewal progam, was the result of a careful, sustained effort by
advocates of urban renewal to shape the jurisprudence of eminent domain.
From the early 1920s through the 1940s, renewal advocates developed their
argument that cities were in crisis and that only major changes in property law
could prevent urban decline. They used these claims to secure the right to
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condemn property and turn it over to others who would use it more
appropriately, thereby changing the meaning of the Public Use Clause.
The conflict between Morris, Schneider, and the D.C. government, as well
as the battles over urban renewal in general, illuminate a critical tension in
American law and politics: the struggle to balance the rights of individual
property owners against societal interests in the development, or protection, of
scarce resources. It is a long-held axiom that government cannot take the
property of one person and give it to another. That principle, however, has
frequently been honored in the breach. For two centuries, local, state, and
federal governments have used eminent domain in pursuit of public policy
goals, often at the expense of the individual property owner but also to the
benefit of purely private interests.
While conflicts over "regulatory takings" have been a vital topic for
scholarly discussion for the past three decades, eminent domain receives far
less consideration.4 The Berman decision is responsible for the relative lack of
attention to this issue. Before Berman, the judicial system played a significant
role in reviewing government condemnations. While courts were generally
deferential to public and private uses of eminent domain, judges frequently
declared that a particular taking was not in the public interest. 5 Berman
severely restricted judicial review in cases of eminent domain.6 Legal scholars
from perspectives as diverse as Richard Epstein, Bruce Ackerman, and
Margaret Radin today view the Public Use Clause as moribund and argue that
government powers of eminent domain are practically limitless. 7 But the law of
eminent domain was, before the mid-1900s, subject to great debate-a debate
that is being resurrected today.
The urban renewal program played a critical role in the demise of the
Public Use Clause. An effort to revitalize the city through the private
4. The literature of regulatory takings is too voluminous to cite. For representative sources, see
WILLIAM FISCHEL, TAKINGS, FEDERALISM AND REGULATORY NORMS: LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS
(1995); Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations,
45 STAN. L. REV. 1369 (199 3 ); Frank Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation' Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Andrea Peterson, The
Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, Part P. A Critique of Current Takings Clause
Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1299 (1989); Andrea Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying
Principles, Part H." Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Moral Justification, 78
CAL. L. REV. 53 (1990); Carol Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still A Muddle, 57
S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); and
William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995).
5. See discussion infra pp. 9-13.
6. While Berman applied only to federal takings, it has been extremely influential upon state courts.
See Laura Mansnerus, Note, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58
N.Y.U. L. REv. 409,426 (1983).
7. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 190 n.5 (1977); RICHARD
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 162 (1985); MARGARET
JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 136-37 (1993).
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redevelopment of publicly condemned land, urban renewal was promoted by
elites as the answer to city decline. Renewal advocates envisioned the creation
of a futuristic metropolis, organized according to modem principles of
planning. Building this new city required the clearance and redevelopment of
large areas of the city. In European cities, such efforts were undertaken by
government, but American renewal advocates opposed such centralized power.
Instead, they argued that cities could be rebuilt privately, and they proposed the
creation of "urban redevelopment corporations." Renewal advocates were a
diverse group-they were real estate interests, progressive reformers, urban
planners, politicians, and other concerned citizens-and they had divergent
goals for the city. But they all agreed that urban revitalization required a broad
application of the government's eminent domain powers.
This initiative necessitated a re-imagining of the public use doctrine
because a program that took the dwellings and businesses of private owners and
transferred them to other private owners to build houses and commercial
operations was, at best, legally problematic. While the law of eminent domain
in the early twentieth century was far from consistent, many legal professionals
believed that taking property and turning it over to others in the manner
conceived by renewal advocates conflicted with the Public Use Clause. The
relevant precedents stated that eminent domain could be used only where it
provided specific benefits to the general public, and critics and supporters alike
questioned whether urban renewal met this standard. Before urban
revitalization could begin, the law would have to change.
To secure political and judicial approval for their efforts, renewal advocates
created a new language of urban decline: a discourse of blight. Blight, renewal
proponents argued, was a disease that threatened to turn healthy areas into
slums. A vague, amorphous term, blight was a rhetorical device that enabled
renewal advocates to reorganize property ownership by declaring certain real
estate dangerous to the future of the city.s To make the case for renewal
programs, advocates contrasted the existing, deteriorated state of urban areas
with the modem, efficient city that would replace them. Urban revitalization
required the condemnation of blighted properties and the transfer of this real
estate to developers who would use it more productively.
By elevating blight into a disease that would destroy the city, renewal
advocates broadened the application of the Public Use Clause and at the same
time brought about a re-conceptualization of property rights. One influential
understanding of property defines it as a bundle of rights, the most important
being the rights to occupy, exclude, use, and transfer.9 In the urban renewal
8. On property as rhetoric, see Jennifer Nedelsky, American Constitutionalism and the Paradox of
Private Property, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (J. Elster & R. Slagstad eds., 1988); and
Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REv. 277 (1998).
9. ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 26-28.
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regime, blighted properties were considered less worthy of the full bundle of
rights recognized by American law. Property owners in blighted areas were due
government-determined fair value for their holdings, while tenants were
grudgingly given relocation assistance, but they were not entitled to
undisturbed possession. When landowners attempted to fight the condemnation
of their properties, state supreme courts from Washington to Maine gave their
blessing to the use of eminent domain for urban renewal. In 1954, in Berman,
the United States Supreme Court also approved the use of eminent domain for
such purposes, opening the door to an era of urban reconstruction that
continues today (although the nature and scope of urban renewal efforts has
since evolved).
The role of the urban renewal program in reshaping the urban landscape is
well-documented. Several studies have shown how urban elites promoted
redevelopment to reorganize urban areas and to protect and enhance their real
estate investments. These scholars have studied the rise of "growth
coalitions"10-groups of business and political leaders that promoted renewal-
and they have examined the political debates over post-war housing policy."1
Other works have documented the impact of urban renewal in intensifying
racial segregation and limiting the mobility of African-Americans. 12 Little work
has been done, however, to explain how renewal advocates secured public and
judicial support for the expansive use of eminent domain in the program. 13
In the past two decades, several legal scholars have studied the changing
interpretations of the Public Use Clause and the central role of the Berman case
in this doctrine. Most students have questioned the broad interpretation of the
Public Use Clause laid out by Justice William 0. Douglas in Berman and have
argued for a narrower reading. Scholars claim that the courts have given too
10. See, e.g., SCOTT GREER, URBAN RENEWAL AND AMERICAN CITIES: THE DILEMMA OF
DEMOCRATIC INTERVENTION (1965); JOHN MOLLENKOPF, THE CONTESTED CITY (1983).
11. See, e.g., RICHARD 0. DAVIES, HOUSING REFORM DURING THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION
(1966); MARK I. GELFAND, A NATION OF CITIES: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN AMERICA,
1933-1965 (1975); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1985); GAIL RADFORD, MODERN HOUSING FOR AMERICA: POLICY STRUGGLES IN THE
NEW DEAL ERA (1996); JON TEAFORD, ROUGH ROAD TO RENAISSANCE: URBAN REVITALIZATION IN
AMERICA (1990); URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY (James Q. Wilson ed.,
1966).
12. See, e.g., RONALD H. BAYOR, RACE AND THE SHAPING OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY ATLANTA
(1996); ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO, 1940-
1960 (1983); ZANE MILLER & BRUCE TUCKER, CHANGING PLANS FOR AMERICA'S INNER CITIES:
CINCINNATI'S OVER-THE-RHINE AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY URBANISM (1998); JOEL SCHWARTZ, THE
NEW YORK APPROACH: ROBERT MOSES, URBAN LIBERALS AND REDEVELOPMENT OF THE INNER CITY
(1993); THOMAS SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR
DETROIT (1996); JUNE MANNING THOMAS, REDEVELOPMENT AND RACE: PLANNING A FINER CITY IN
POSTWAR DETROIT (1997).
13. Robert Beauregard has examined the role of rhetoric in the understanding of urban problems.
See ROBERT A. BEAUREGARD, VOICES OF DECLINE: THE POSTWAR FATE OF AMERICAN CITIES (1993).
Robert Fogelson examines the rise of blight rhetoric in his new book, DOWNTOWN: ITS RISE AND FALL,
1880-1950(2001).
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much discretion to legislatures and administrative bodies to use eminent
domain and that these powers have been used by interested parties to distort
private market negotiations over coveted properties. 14 These studies explore the
application of the Berman doctrine and its role in the law of eminent domain
today, but legal scholars have not analyzed the context in which state courts
and the United States Supreme Court broadened their interpretation of the
Public Use Clause.
By examining the emergence of the urban renewal program, this Article
highlights the role of legal consciousness in shaping urban policy.' 5 The elites
who promoted urban renewal (with some exceptions) shared an ideology that
held private property rights sacrosanct, and they were profoundly skeptical
about governmental intervention in the economy. But, at the same time,
renewal advocates realized that government power was necessary to secure
their goal of urban revitalization. While a small number of urban planners were
less reticent about increased government influence over private property, most
renewal advocates believed that condemnation would focus on a discrete group
of properties that they would systematically select. They did not want to
dismantle the protections provided by the Public Use Clause so much as carve
out an exception that, they argued, clearly served the public interest. In reality,
the initially modest effort to secure legal authority for urban renewal paved the
way for wide-ranging powers of condemnation.
The stated goal of the urban renewal program was to provide a means for
public/private partnerships in urban development. But renewal programs were
controlled by a small number of real estate interests and politicians who used
the power of eminent domain to reorganize urban land. Today, the
redevelopment agencies they created, like many other "public authorities,"
remain insulated from political accountability, and they have been criticized as
a result. 16 The legal and political history of these urban redevelopment
authorities, moreover, contributes to the history of the American administrative
state.17 Most theories of the administrative state posit a publicly-managed
14. See, e.g., Stephen J. Jones, Trumping Eminent Domain Law: An Argument for Strict Scrutiny
Analysis Under the Public Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 285, 289-90
(2000); Donald J. Kochan, "Public Use" and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in Interest-
Group Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49, 60-61 (1998); Joseph J. Lazzaroti, Public Use or Public
Abuse, 68 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 49 (1999); Mansnerus, supra note 6; Errol E. Meidinger, The
"Public Uses" of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENVTL. L. 1, 18 (1981). For less critical
views of judicial interpretations of the Public Use Clause, see Lawrence Berger, The Public Use
Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203, 213 (1978); and Thomas Merrill, The Economics
of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986).
15. On the study of "legal consciousness" in history, see Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of
Aspiration and "The Rights That Belong to Us All," 74 J. AM. HIST. 1013 (1987); and Christopher
Tomlins, Subordination, Authority, Law: Subjects in Labor History, 47 INT'L LAB. & WORKING-CLASS
HIST. 56 (1995).
16. See infra notes 223-225 and accompanying text.
17. On the rise of the American administrative state, see STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW
AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982);
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bureaucracy, created as the result of public pressure, that regulates a discrete
subset of the economy. Redevelopment agencies, however, complicate these
theories because they were created to serve private ends and were controlled by
the interests that created them.
18
The role of blight terminology in restricting racial mobility has also been
under-appreciated by legal scholars. Blight was a facially neutral term infused
with racial and ethnic prejudice. While it purportedly assessed the state of
urban infrastructure, blight was often used to describe the negative impact of
certain residents on city neighborhoods. This "scientific" method of
understanding urban decline was used to justify the removal of blacks and other
minorities from certain parts of the city. By selecting racially changing
neighborhoods as blighted areas and designating them for redevelopment, the
urban renewal program enabled institutional and political elites to relocate
minority populations and entrench racial segregation. Berman was decided just
six months after Brown v. Board of Education,19 but while Brown receives
more attention, Berman was equally influential in shaping American race
relations. The urban renewal program played a crucial role in redistributing
urban populations and creating additional obstacles to efforts to achieve
integration.
The legal history of the urban renewal program also provides an example of
the changing nature of property rights in the United States. Several influential
scholars, particularly Joseph Sax, Carol Rose, and Laura Underkuffler, have
argued that property rights should be viewed as "evolutionary" doctrines. These
scholars, while they differ in their explanations of the process, agree that
property does not have a static definition but rather reflects relationships
between people, and between government and individuals, that have changed
over time. Understanding the evolution of property rights requires an
examination of the ways that people conceive of their relationship to property
in particular historical contexts.
20
THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (Margaret Weir et al. eds., 1988); Michael K.
Brown, State Capacity and Political Choice: Interpreting the Failure of the Third New Deal, in 9
STUDIES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 187 (1995); Ira Katznelson & Bruce Pietrykowski,
Rebuilding the American State: Evidence from the 1940s, in 5 STUDIES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT 301 (Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek eds., 1991); and Andrew A. Workman,
Creating the National War Labor Board: Franklin Roosevelt and the Politics of State Building in the
Early 1940s, 12 J. POL'Y HIST. 233 (2000).
18. On the complicated nature of public authorities, see A. Scott Henderson, Charles Abrams and
the Problem of the "Business Welfare State," 9 J. POL'Y HIST. 211 (1997); Gail Radford, William Gibbs
McAdoo, the Emergency Fleet Corporation, and the Origins of the Public-Authority Model of
Government Action, 11 J. POL'Y HIST. 59 (1999); and Keith D. Revell, Cooperation, Capture and
Autonomy: The Interstate Commerce Commission and the Port Authority in the 1920s, 12 J. POL'Y HIST.
177 (2000).
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. See Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New Takings Jurisprudence:
An Evolutionary Approach, 57 TENN. L. REV. 577 (1990); Joseph L. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline
of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REV. 481 (1983); Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100
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This Article will examine how the interaction of renewal advocates and the
courts changed legal conceptions of property in the middle of the twentieth
century. Part I outlines the movement for urban renewal in the early twentieth
century and surveys the law of takings from the early 1800s to the 1930s. Part
II discusses the role of rhetoric in the efforts of renewal advocates to rally
public support for urban redevelopment during the 1920s and 1930s. Part III
describes the intimate relationship, both political and jurisprudential, between
the New Deal public housing program and the expansion of urban renewal. Part
IV examines the continued role of blight rhetoric in the lobbying effort to
create urban renewal programs during the 1940s. Part V analyzes several early
renewal projects and describes the efforts of renewal proponents to create a
national urban renewal program. Part VI traces the acceptance of the discourse
of blight by state courts and examines the Berman case. The Conclusion
surveys the post-Berman expansion of public and private eminent domain
powers and briefly discusses current debates over the public use doctrine.
I. PROGRESSIVE ERA HOUSING REFORM AND THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Fears of the "contagion" of the slums captured the attention of reformers
throughout the 1800s. Toward the end of the century, the slum became the
main focus of Progressive reformers. After Jacob Riis exposed the problem in
his best-selling book, How the Other Half Lives,2 1 hundreds of college educated
men and women followed him into the warrens of the poor in American cities.
While reformers like Jane Addams looked to use the talents of the poor to
rebuild their neighborhoods themselves, others like Lawrence Veiller sought to
secure the powers of local government to erase the slums. Veiller pushed New
York and other cities to adopt housing regulations that he thought would force
landlords to meet minimum maintenance standards and builders to construct
modem dwellings.22 These laws sometimes resulted in better housing, but their
impact in improving the slum was minimal.23
While there were many nineteenth century attempts to regulate working-
class housing, the first serious efforts at "slum clearance" began in New York
City at the end of the century. After years of agitation by housing reformers, the
state passed the Tenement House Act of 1895, which allowed the city Board of
YALE L.J. 127 (1990). I am not arguing that these scholars share the same position on the meaning of
property and property rights, rather that, in defining property as "evolutionary," these scholars have
"historicized" the question. In order to analyze the changing nature of property and property rights, we
need to understand the historical context in which these issues were debated.
21. JACOB A. RIIs, How THE OTHER HALF LIVES: STUDIES AMONG THE TENEMENTS OF NEW
YORK (1904).
22. See THE TENEMENT HOUSE PROBLEM (Robert W. DeForest & Lawrence Veiller eds., 1903);
Lawrence Veiller, Housing Reform Through Legislation, 51 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 68
(1914).
23. See ROY LUBOVE, THE PROGRESSIVES AND THE SLUMS: TENEMENT HOUSE REFORM IN NEW
YORK CITY, 1890-1917 (1962).
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Health to condemn and demolish buildings declared unfit for human habitation.
Progressives hoped that this legislation would eliminate the decrepit tenements
that exacerbated the health and social problems in slum areas, but New York's
landlords vigorously fought the passage and enforcement of the Act. As a
24result, its implementation was inconsistent at best.
Housing reformers faced several major impediments to clearing the slums.
The administration of a housing regulatory system required the development of
detailed building standards for judging dilapidated housing as well as the
employment of qualified persons to enforce these standards. Neither were
available in the infancy of urban America's regulatory system. The biggest
obstacle to redevelopment was the inability of housing administrators to secure
title to run-down, but frequently profitable, slum tenements. In the early 1900s,
condemnation was a complicated, time consuming process, and conservative
judges, as well as entrenched political corruption, frequently prevented housing
officials from acquiring the buildings they sought. In addition, the Supreme
Court's requirement that condemnors pay fair market value for property taken
(not a price determined by the city) inhibited large-scale takings of slum
property.
Housing reformers had conflicting views on the best means to eliminate the
slum. Most realized that the tenement economy survived because housing was
desperately needed by the urban poor. Destruction of tenements required the
construction of replacement housing, but because they were strongly opposed
to government interference with the private market, most reformers refused to
support public housing programs. Veiller, one of the most vocal critics of
tenements, consistently asserted that "government housing play[s] no part in
the solutions of housing problems. The motto of the American people," he
argued, "is to keep the government out of private business and to keep private
business out of government. ' '25 Veiller and other housing reformers supported
and organized private associations to purchase slum properties and redevelop
them, but they lacked the funds needed to make a major impact.26 They hoped
to secure the power of eminent domain for private redevelopment of the slum,
but most legal scholars in the early 1900s believed that this violated the Public
Use Clause.
27
24. See MAX PAGE, THE CREATIVE DESTRUCTION OF MANHATrAN 90-92 (1999).
25. Id. at 91.
26. See A. SCOTT HENDERSON, HOUSING AND THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL: THE LIFE AND THOUGHT
OF CHARLES ABRAMS 49 (2000); RADFORD, supra note 11.
27. One effort that achieved limited success in eliminating slums was the use of what reformers
called "excess condemnation." Properties adjacent to those necessary for the construction of government
projects were taken and sold to defray the costs of the project. During the construction of the Manhattan
and Williamsburg Bridges in the early 1900s, for example, the use of excess condemnation enabled the
city to clear 700 tenements (uprooting 50,000 people) on the Lower East Side. Excess condemnation
was attacked as an unreasonable extension of the public use doctrine, and some courts limited its
application. But most state supreme courts approved the process. These battles were among the earliest
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From the American Revolution through the first half of the twentieth
century, the law of eminent domain was full of inconsistencies. Rationalization
of the diverse state and federal court rulings about what constituted a valid
public use was extremely difficult. The founding fathers, moreover, left little
guidance on the meaning of the term. Although the sovereign's right of eminent
domain was part of natural law principles adopted by the Constitutional
Convention from English law, little evidence exists to explain why the framers
included the limitation that condemned land be taken solely for public use. In
the first half of the 1800s, every state except North Carolina included a public
use clause in its constitution, but they too provided little guidance on the
meaning of the phrase. As a result, courts interpreted these clauses on an ad hoc
basis. During the nineteenth century, state courts vacillated between support for
an expansive use of eminent domain and a fear that condemnation would be
abused to the detriment of individual property rights. The United States
Supreme Court, moreover, infrequently expounded upon the meaning of the
Public Use Clause, and when the Court did consider cases involving
condemnation, its principles-private property rights were sacrosanct-
conflicted with its approval of a wide variety of condemnations.
28
In the early Republic, eminent domain was used to support the expansion of
the nascent economy, and many state courts adopted a broad interpretation of
public use to support the taking of property for mills, dams, or roads, holding
that these enterprises provided a "public benefit." 29  Even though
condemnations of property for dams or highways frequently provided
significant advantages to individual parties, courts concluded that because the
facilities resulting from the condemnation could be exploited by a large number
of people, they did not violate the restriction that condemned property be for
public use. As the Industrial Revolution gathered steam, the use of the power of
eminent domain for railroads, utilities, and other types of improvements
increased. To support economic development, legislatures across the country
granted private corporations the right to condemn property needed for
expansion. As with prior condemnations, such takings were approved on the
theory that the fruits of the takings would be available to the general public.
According to legal historian Harry Scheiber, "'the comfort, convenience and
efforts of urban reformers to expand the limits of the public use doctrine. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 12,
at 14; Note, The Public Use Limitation in Eminent Domain, An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599,
606-07 (1949).
28. See Meidinger, supra note 14, at 18; see also STANLEY K. SCHULTZ, CONSTRUCTING URBAN
CULTURE: AMERICAN CITIES AND CITY PLANNING, 1800-1920, at 41 (1989); Berger, supra note 14, at
213; Jones, supra note 14, at 289-290; Kochan, supra note 14, at 60-61.
29. Nineteenth century judges approached questions of eminent domain, economic regulation, and
taxation in a similar fashion, seeking to ascertain the nature of the "public interest" in each activity. The
interconnectedness of these three areas of law was crucial to the rise of the doctrine of substantive due
process. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 6 (1998); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 54-55
(1993).
Yale Law & Policy Review
prosperity of the people' became a principal justification in the American
courts generally for accepting legislative determinations that certain older
vested rights in property must be forced to give way to the technological and
entrepreneurial agents of progress." 30 Through the Civil War, state courts
approved a wide variety of takings.
31
Towards the end of the 1800s, an increasing number of judges attempted to
restrict the use of eminent domain by private parties. Worried about the rise of
"class legislation" that favored certain interests over the public good, leading
jurists like Michigan Supreme Court Chief Justice Thomas Cooley argued that
condemnation should be used only in cases of clear public benefit. In his
seminal treatise, Constitutional Limitations, Cooley stated that a public use
should be found only "where the government is supplying its own needs, or is
furnishing facilities for its citizens in regard to those matters of public
necessity, convenience or welfare." 32 In response to the growing power of
corporations to secure public aid for growth, Cooley argued that "the
distinction between different classes or occupations, and the favoring of one at
the expense of the rest ... is not legitimate legislation." 33 This restrictive view
of the proper application of the government's eminent domain powers placed
many laws supporting economic development in question. In the 1877 case
Reyerson v. Brown, for example, Cooley declared Michigan's Milldam Act of
1873, which allowed private companies to condemn land for the construction of
water-powered mills, unconstitutional and stated that private corporations could
be given the right of eminent domain only in cases of "extreme necessity.
Concerned that government support for private business would be followed
by government regulation of free enterprise, many nineteenth century judges
invalidated attempts at public/private cooperation. In their zeal to protect
business from government intervention, courts in the late 1800s frequently
deprived corporations of public benefits, including financial subsidy and rights
30. Harry Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the
State Courts, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 329, 370, 386 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds.,
1971).
31. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 259-61
(1977); SCHULTZ, supra note 28, at 89; Berger, supra note 14, at 208-09; Jones, supra note 14, at 291;
Kochan, supra note 14, at 291-92; Meidinger, supra note 14, at 24; Harry Scheiber, Property Law,
Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government: The United States, 1789-1910, 33 J. ECON.
HIST. 232 (1973).
32. THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 533 (2d ed. 1871).
33. People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 487 (1870), cited in GILLMAN, supra note 29, at 56. On Cooley's
views regarding "class legislation," see Alan Jones, Thomas M Cooley and the Michigan Supreme
Court, 1865-1886, 10 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 97 (1966).
34. Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 334, 339 (1877); see also Scheiber, supra note 30, at 386. The
Illinois Supreme Court concurred in this position, declaring that state's Mills and Millers Act of 1872
illegal. See Gaylord v. Sanitary Dist., 68 N.E. 522 (I11. 903). Harry Scheiber argues that in the West the
courts continued to be amenable to a broad interpretation of the Public Use Clause. Scheiber, supra note
31, at 244-47.
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of condemnation.35 In 1888, the New York Court of Appeals voided the
Niagara Falls and Whirlpool Railway Company's state-granted right of eminent
domain. Citing Judge Cooley, the court declared that, while the railroad might
provide a means for the public to "fully gratify their curiosity" in seeing the
falls, this was not a sufficiently compelling purpose to justify the use of
condemnation. 36 The court further argued that while it was cognizant that the
legislature had declared such a use to benefit the public, the final determination
of what constituted a public use remained the court's prerogative.37 In the late
1800s and early 1900s, other state supreme courts took similarly restrictive
positions on the appropriate uses of eminent domain.38
Most nineteenth century battles over the appropriation of land were fought
in the state courts, which were generally ambivalent towards expansive
interpretations of the Public Use Clause. The United States Supreme Court,
when it considered such matters, however, was generally amenable to the use
of eminent domain to support economic development. The Court's broad
interpretation of the Public Use Clause was at odds with its oft-stated
opposition to government intervention in the economy. 39 The 1896 case of
Missouri Pacific Railway v. Nebraska4" is one of the few where the Court
viewed eminent domain with suspicion. In that case, the Court considered a
state act that required the Missouri Pacific Railroad to allow farmers to
construct a cooperative grain elevator on its property, declaring that to order the
railroad to set aside its own land for such purposes violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the grain elevators would
provide benefits to the farmers who used them rather than the general public,
the Court reasoned, the program was unconstitutional. "[S]o far as it required
the railroad corporation to surrender a part of its land to the petitioners," the
law was, "in essence and effect, a taking of private property... for the private
use of [another]," the Court stated.4'
The Court's statement that the property of one person cannot be taken for
the benefit of another was used so frequently in the early 1900s that it became
35. See Scheiber, supra note 30, at 392.
36. In re the Application of the Niagara Falls & Whirlpool Ry. Co., 15 N.E. 429, 432 (N.Y. 1888).
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Minn. Canal & Power v. Koochiching, 107 N.W. 414 (Minn. 1906); R.R. Co. v. Iron
Works, 8 S.E. 453,467 (W. Va. 1888).
39. For a review of the late nineteenth century views of the Supreme Court, see GILLMAN, supra
note 29, at 6-15; Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Reevaluation of the Meaning and
Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 L. & HIST. REv. 293 (1985); David Gold, Redfields,
Railroads and the Roots of "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism," 27 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 254 (1983);
Charles McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some
Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970 (1975).
40. 164 U.S. 403 (1896).
41. Id. at 417. Later that year, the Court specifically declared that the public use provisions of the
Fifth Amendment applied to the states. See Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158
(1896); see also Meidinger, supra note 14, at 30.
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axiomatic, but the principle was frequently honored in the breach. In spite of
the strong language the Court used in declaring the Nebraska Act
unconstitutional, it was thereafter reluctant to overrule state or federal
condemnations. During the early twentieth century, the Justices were amenable
to a wide variety of takings, and Missouri Pacific is the only case in which the
Court invalidated a state-approved condemnation. Unlike other areas of
economic regulation in which the Court continued to view legislative acts with
suspicion, in a wide variety of cases, it ceded the authority to determine what
42constituted a public use to the state courts. In 1923, the Court declared that it
would regard state court determinations regarding the Public Use Clause "with
great respect" and concluded that its review of public use cases was
exceedingly limited.43 Rejecting the view that condemned property had to be
available to the general public, the Court also stated that it was "not essential
that the entire community, nor even any considerable portion, should directly
enjoy or participate in order to constitute a public use."44 While the Justices
never varied from, and stated frequently, their view that property could not be
condemned and transferred to another party, their expansive readings of the
Fifth Amendment gave encouragement to advocates of urban renewal.
45
At the same time the Court was approving a wide variety of takings, it
handed renewal advocates another tool to control urban development. In the
1926 case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company, Justice Sutherland
ruled that zoning codes were an acceptable government measure to shape urban
areas and did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.46 Sutherland concluded that zoning was an acceptable method to
control public nuisances and within the police powers of local government to
protect the health and safety of residents. Many of the leading urban reformers,
in particular Alfred Bettman, who wrote a persuasive amicus curiae brief on
behalf of the Village of Euclid, would later argue that the Court's opinion
42. For cases considering the public use doctrine, see, for example, Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel
Improvement District, 262 U.S. 710 (1923) (state could condemn land to build tunnel for railroad);
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (war emergency provided public purpose for statute protecting
tenants from eviction); Hendersonville Light and Power Co. v. Blue Ridge International, 243 U.S. 563
(1917) (company could condemn land to build power plant for street railway); Mt. Vernon-Woodbery
Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30 (1916) (allowing power company to
condemn land for electric project). See also Berger, supra note 14, at 213; Mansnerus, supra note 6, at
414.
43. Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923).
44. Id.
45. In the small number of cases that involved takings by the federal government, the Court also
gave federal agencies similar broad discretion. See United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S.
668 (1896) (Congress could authorize condemnation of Gettysburg Battlefield); Luxton v. N. River
Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525 (1894) (Congress could authorize condemnation of land for construction of
bridge); Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1893) (D.C. administrator could condemn land for
public park).
46. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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supported the use of eminent domain for urban renewal.47
While the United States Supreme Court accepted the necessity of
government coercion in support of economic development in the early
twentieth century, in many state courts, particularly those in the Northeast and
Midwest (the areas with the largest, oldest cities), the doctrine of public use
remained limited. The appellate courts of New York and Ohio continued to
hold to a narrow interpretation of the clause and viewed with skepticism state
legislative delegations of eminent domain powers to private parties.48 In 1912,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in an advisory opinion,
specifically declared that housing was not a "public use" for which public funds
could be spent.49 The insistence of these courts that it was the judiciary's role to
determine what constituted a public use, and their refusal to develop standards
by which to define the doctrine, made a large-scale urban renewal scheme a
very risky undertaking.
But the conflicting legal precedents were not the only reason that renewal
advocates struggled with the law of eminent domain. Equally important, the
scheme conflicted with renewal advocates' deeply rooted conceptions of
property rights. The principle that one person's property could not be taken and
given to another was ingrained in their understanding of American
jurisprudence. The Public Use Clause restrained government from abusing
private property owners, and it was a constitutional protection against
socialism. Renewal advocates navigated a narrow path between the Scylla of
continued urban decline, and the Charybdis of increased government influence
over private property. They needed a method to secure government assistance
while retaining private control over urban redevelopment and to achieve urban
redevelopment without drastically altering legal protections for private property
in general. The discourse of blight provided a means to achieve their goals.
II. THE DISCOVERY OF BLIGHT
During the 1920s, American cities witnessed a construction boom that
surpassed all previous periods of growth. Skyscrapers rose higher than ever,
bridges spanned rivers across the country, and public buildings sprouted
throughout urban areas. In addition, several million units of housing were built
47. On the importance of Euclid in urban law, see Richard Chused, Euclid's Historical Imagery, 51
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 597, 611-13 (2001); and Melvyn Durchslag, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., Seventy-Five Years Later: This is Not Your Father's Zoning Ordinance, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
645 (2001).
48. See, e.g., Little Falls Fibre Co. v. Henry Ford & Son, Inc., 229 N.Y.S. 445, 449 (App. Div.
1928) (prohibiting construction of dam on Mohawk River); Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Bd. of
Comm'rs., 135 N.E. 635 (Ohio 1922) (prohibiting condemnation of land where public use was unclear);
see also WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN NEW
YORK, 1920-1980, at 28 (2001).
49. In re Opinion of the Justices, 98 N.E. 611 (Mass. 1912).
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during the decade, allowing second generation immigrants to escape the slums.
But while these were healthy changes, many urban elites realized that cities
would face trouble in the near future. The expansion of the suburbs drew the
rich and middle-class out of the city. At the same time, the combination of
slowed immigration and economic mobility resulted in increased vacancy rates
in working-class districts. The number of residents in the urban core declined,
to the joy of housing reformers, but the slums remained, impervious to
change.
50
Throughout the 1920s, renewal advocates hoped that run-down
neighborhoods, at least those close to the business and entertainment districts,
would provide profit-making opportunities that would result in the private
acquisition and clearance of deteriorated structures. However, instead of
rebuilding older neighborhoods, developers focused on the outlying areas and
the suburbs. The construction of mass transit and improvements in roads made
these new units easily accessible, and developers generally avoided the
problems that came with inner-city development. In New York City, for
example, despite dramatic growth during the decade, some 67,000 substandard
buildings remained in the city as of 1930.51
The late 1920s brought a convergence of forces that supported the urban
renewal movement, and several groups that were formerly antagonists in the
battle for city revitalization began to cooperate. Real estate interests, housing
reformers, and big-city politicians all hoped to reap benefits through urban
renewal, and they formed a tenuous coalition to promote redevelopment. Their
goals were widely divergent. Housing reformers wanted government support to
eliminate decrepit housing and replace it with modern, affordable dwellings.
Politicians hoped to increase their cities' tax bases and provide jobs (as well as
opportunities for graft) to their constituents. Real estate interests sought to gain
access to large parcels of downtown property for profitable redevelopment.
52
The planning profession provided a common language that joined real
estate interests, housing reformers, and local government. Planners argued that
cities were anarchic and inefficient, and they sought to rationalize the city
through the development of strict standards for city growth. Successful city
development, they claimed, required a professional analysis of the needs and
resources of urban areas. During the construction boom of the 1920s, planners
played a major role in the development of suburban communities and, through
professional societies like the American Institute of Planners and the American
50. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 26.
51. See PAGE, supra note 24, at 72-73.
52. On the varied goals and interests of urban renewal advocates, see FOGELSON, supra note 13, at
346-47; PETER HALL, CITIES OF TOMORROW: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF URBAN PLANNING AND
DESIGN IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 228-29 (1996); TEAFORD, supra note 11, at 26-29; and John F.
Bauman, Visions of a Post-War City: A Perspective on Urban Planning in Philadelphia and the Nation,
1942-1945, 6 URBANISM PAST & PRESENT, Winter/Spring, 1980-81, at 1.
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Society of Planning Officials, became intimately involved in the reorganization
of urban life.53
Herbert Hoover's vocal support for zoning and comprehensive planning
was crucial to the growth of the planning profession and to the rise of the urban
renewal movement. As Secretary of Commerce, Hoover created a Special
Division of Building and Housing, which promoted planning through the
development of the Standard City Planning Enabling Act, a model law adopted
by many states during the 1920s. The Commerce Department also published
and distributed the City Planning Primer, which promoted the benefits of
zoning and other types of urban planning.54 In 1931, Hoover convened the
Conference on Home Building and Homeownership, an intensive study of the
state of American housing. The thirty-one committees of the conference
examined every aspect of the problems facing cities and suburbs. Among these
groups was the Committee on Blighted Areas and Slums, which promoted its
plan for urban redevelopment as "a combination of governmental aid in the
clearing of sites and of private enterprise in rebuilding upon them ..... 55 This
plan would require the passage of "enabling legislation that will permit and
facilitate the large-scale condemnation of slum areas," the committee
reported.56
Urban planners like Alfred Bettman, Harland Bartholomew, and John
Ihlder, and real estate interests including Metropolitan Life Insurance President
Frederick Ecker and Leonard Reaume, former president of the National
Association of Real Estate Boards, were active participants in this conference,
and they shaped discussions over the future of American housing. They formed
a powerful, nation-wide coalition to fight for slum clearance. The influence of
planners also continued to rise as the New Deal established agencies like the
National Resources Planning Board (run by urban planner Frederic Delano,
President Roosevelt's cousin), which funded the preparation of local and
regional plans.
This coalition worked to foster a political climate amenable to the radical
reconstruction of urban areas. Led by the planners in the group, they gradually
developed a new terminology of city decline, a discourse of blight and renewal.
53. On the rise of the planning profession, see M. CHRISTINE BOYER, DREAMING THE RATIONAL
CITY: THE MYTH OF AMERICAN CITY PLANNING 206 (1983); HALL, supra note 52, at 136-75; MEL
SCOTT, AMERICAN CITY PLANNING SINCE 1890, at 397-400 (1971); and Robert Beauregard, Between
Modernity and Postmodernity: The Ambiguous Position of U.S. Planning, 7 ENV'T & PLAN. D: SOC'Y &
SPACE 381, 388 (1989).
54. On Hoover's role, see Janet Hutchinson, Shaping Housing and Enhancing Consumption:
Hoover's Interwar Housing Policy, in FROM TENEMENTS TO THE TAYLOR HOMES: IN SEARCH OF AN
URBAN HOUSING POLICY IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 81 (John F. Bauman et al. eds., 2000). See
also Chused, supra note 47, at 598-99; Radford, supra note 11, at 86.
55. PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE ON HOME BUILDING AND HOMEOWNERSHIP, 3 SLUMS, LARGE-
SCALE HOUSING AND DECENTRALIZATION 25 (John M. Gries & James Ford eds., 1932).
56. Id. at xii.
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This discourse contrasted the existing, deteriorated state of urban areas with a
possible modem, revitalized future. Vital to this effort was the elevation of two
terms topublic attention: "slums" and "blight." Advocates worked to convince
urban residents that these problems would continue to plague cities without
government intervention. In book after book, including Mabel Walker's Slums
and Blight and Edith Elmer Wood's Slums and Blighted Areas, as well as in
professional journals like American Planning and Civic Annual, Architectural
Record, and National Municipal Review, planners developed an increasingly
complex lexicon of terms to describe these phenomena and explained why they
plagued cities. A slum, according to planners, was an area with run-down
buildings, dirty streets, and a high crime rate that was almost exclusively
inhabited by poor people. While the popular view of the slums focused on the
inhabitants, planners concentrated on the conditions that created such areas.
According to the experts, a slum was a district that had an excess of buildings
that "either because of dilapidation, obsolescence, overcrowding, poor
arrangement or design, lack of ventilation, light or sanitary facilities, or a
combination of these factors, are detrimental to the safety, health, morals and
comfort of the inhabitants thereof., 57 A slum was a "social liability to the
community" because it spawned crime and other problems.
58
Other urban areas did not meet the definition of a slum, but they were
"blighted." The term was first used by the Chicago school of sociology.
Founded in the Progressive era, the Chicago school was led by Robert Park,
Ernest Burgess, and R.D. McKenzie, and produced an impressive amount of
scholarship that focused in particular on the problems of the poor in cities.
These scholars introduced the "ecological approach" to the field of sociology,
and this method of study was crucial to early twentieth century understandings
of urban change. Blight, originally used to describe plant diseases, was a part of
this broader approach to understanding society. 59 Cities were like living
organisms, the Chicago school argued, and, therefore, urban change occurred in
natural patterns. Blight arose around the central business district, in areas that
were formerly residential. As cities expanded, these areas became mixed use
districts, with industry and commerce. The formerly attractive housing was
57. MABEL WALKER, URBAN BLIGHT AND SLUMS 3 (1936),
58. Id. at 3 (1935). On the role of discourse in shaping policies towards cities, see CHRISTOPHER
MELE, SELLING THE LOWER EAST SIDE: CULTURE, REAL ESTATE AND RESISTANCE IN NEW YORK CITY
(2000).
59. See LEONARD REISSMAN, THE URBAN PROCESS: CITIES IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES 93-121
(1964); Ernest Burgess, The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project, in THE CITY 47
(Robert E. Park et al. eds., 1925); Roderick D. McKenzie, The Ecological Approach to the Study of the
Human Community, in THE CITY 63 (Ernest Burgess et al. eds., 1925).
60. Scholars like Homer Hoyt argued that these areas became blighted because property owners
expected the central business district to expand. Owners let their properties decline because they thought
that they would be demolished after they were bought for redevelopment. HOMER HOYT, ONE HUNDRED
YEARS OF LAND VALUES IN CHICAGO 364 (1936).
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divided into smaller units for the poor, and "parasitic and transitory services"
such as flophouses proliferated.61
In periods of migration, these areas were "invaded" by ethnic and racial
minorities in search of affordable housing. This use of medical terminology by
the Chicago school made its analysis appear objective and scientific, but it also
reflected the general prejudices of society regarding racial minorities,
particularly blacks. In his discussion of Chicago, Burgess noted the
"disturbances of metabolism caused by an excessive increase [in population]
such as those which followed the great influx of southern Negroes" into the city
after World War 1.62 These waves of people caused a "speeding up of the
junking process in the area of deterioration.' '63 Another study, which
acknowledged that many areas occupied by blacks had other unattractive
features, concluded that "certain racial and national groups ... cause a greater
physical deterioration of property than groups higher in the social and
economic scale." 64 Blight, therefore, may have been a naturally occurring
process, but racial minorities were central to the Chicago school's
understanding of urban change.
For urban planners and other renewal advocates, the theory of urban
ecology became a means of reorganizing property rights within the city. Not
surprisingly, planners argued that blight was caused by lack of planning.
"Unguided urban growth" and an "indiscriminate mixture of homes, factories,
warehouses, junk yards, and stores that has resulted in depressed property
values" were responsible for urban blight.65 Buildings in these areas were
"obsolete" because "an excessive amount of land is devoted to streets and
alleys. ' 66 The streets in these districts, which were built for horses, had "now
become motor speedways.' '67 Population densities in these areas were higher
than acceptable under "principles of modem planning., 68 All of these problems
69were the result of "unplanned urban expansion" without appropriate zoning.
To renewal advocates, blight was bad not only because of the damage it caused
to residents, but also because it drained urban resources. The increasing costs of
police and social services in these areas, combined with the loss of tax revenues
70as people left the city, placed a significant burden on government.
61. McKenzie, supra note 59, at 76.
62. Burgess, supra note 59, at 54.
63. Id.
64. HOYT, supra note 60, at 314.
65. MEL ScoTr, METROPOLITAN LOS ANGELES: ONE COMMUNITY 108 (1950).




70. See EDITH ELMER WOOD, SLUMS AND BLIGHTED AREAS IN THE UNITED STATES 19-21 (1935).
For discussions of the general chacteristics of slums and blighted areas, see BEAUREGARD, supra note
13, at 136-37; MILES COLEAN, RENEWING OUR CITIES 38-39 (1953); JAMES FORD, SLUMS AND
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Renewal advocates never developed a systematic process by which to
determine when an area was blighted. While they devoted a great deal of study
to blighted areas, renewal advocates preferred to define the phenomenon with
vague generalities. Hoover's slum committee, for example, declared that "a
blighted area is an area where, due either to the lack of a vitalizing factor or to
the presence of a devitalizing factor, the life of the area has been sapped.",71
Hoover's committee, however, did concede that in some cases "a slum has
become economically profitable because of the high rents that can be obtained
for improper use, and is not long blighted according to the definition."
Nevertheless, the area was still a problem, the committee argued. In fact,
"because of this economic strength, it is a greater danger to the community,"
they declared .7
In popular discussions of the issue, renewal advocates often merged their
descriptions of slums and blighted areas. This served useful political and
judicial purposes because slums were known problems. Frequently, planners
argued that a blighted area was one "on its way to becoming a slum." 73 The fear
of the slums provided planners an argument for their attempts to take control of
blight. As the term originally described plant diseases, the evocation of blight
created a vision of a plague spreading across the city, moving from one
neighborhood to the next. The future of the city rested upon the effort to stop its
spread. For this reason, renewal advocates asserted, these areas had to be
cleared and rebuilt. "We must cut out the whole cancer and not leave any
diseased tissue," stated New York City Comptroller Joseph McGoldrick. 4
Because the term was so poorly defined, blight became a useful rhetorical
device-a means by which real estate interests could reorganize property
ownership by separating "productive" and "unproductive" land uses. The
development of the discourse of blight provided real estate investors with a
means to rationalize urban land ownership. In the early 1900s, the majority of
rental properties in large American cities were owned by individuals (many of
them immigrants). Landlords typically owned just a few properties and
frequently did not have the resources to maintain or improve them. These small
landholdings were inefficient, developers argued, and they prevented the
HOUSING 11 (1936); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOUSING OFFICIALS, HOUSING OFFICIALS YEARBOOK
1936, at 241 (Coleman Woodbury ed., 1936); and WALKER, supra note 57, at 4-6.
71. PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE ON HOME BUILDING AND HOMEOWNERSHIP, supra note 55, at 41.
72. Id. at 2.
73. WALKER, supra note 57, at 4; see also GELFAND, supra note 11, at 109.
74. Joseph D. McGoldrick, The Superblock Instead ofSlums, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 19, 1944, at
54-55, cited in Howard Gillette, The Evolution of Neighborhood Planning: From the Progressive Era to
the 1949 Housing Act, 9 J. URB. HIST. 421, 437 (1983). On the use of language to shape policies towards
urban areas, see ROBERT HALPERN, REBUILDING THE INNER CITY: A HISTORY OF NEIGHBORHOOD
INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 67 (1995); and MELE, supra note 58, at 20-
22.
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production of modem, large-scale housing and commercial projects.75 Real
estate development was an emerging field in the 1920s, when mortgage bankers
and institutional investors expanded their role in housing production
dramatically in the suburbs and outlying areas of the city. 76 Many institutional
investors saw potential in the urban core, but because they faced
insurmountable obstacles to securing title to property in congested urban areas,
redevelopment of slum areas stagnated. Eminent domain, therefore, was sought
as a necessary means for the efficient accumulation of urban property.
Realtors, developers, and mortgage bankers were served by the National
Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB) in their efforts to secure access to
urban land. Formed in 1908 to professionalize the selling of real estate, the
NAREB subsequently expanded into many other areas of property
development, and by the 1930s, it was one of the most powerful interest groups
in the nation. The real estate executives who led the group were instrumental in
the creation of new methods of real estate finance and insurance, and as the
originators of planned suburban communities, they were vital to the growth of
the field of planning. Led by Herbert Nelson during the 1930s and '40s, the
group promoted a variety of programs to privately redevelop urban
neighborhoods. The NAREB was aided in this effort by its research wing, the
Urban Land Institute (ULI), described by its director, Hugh Potter, as "the city
planning department of the Realtors of this country., 77 Together, the NAREB
and ULI used the language of planning to persuade the public to support the use
of eminent domain for private redevelopment.
As real estate interests became increasingly active in the promotion of
urban redevelopment, Nelson and other renewal advocates shifted the analysis
of blighted areas towards economic concerns. The problem with blighted areas
was not only that they might become slums with their concomitant social
problems. More importantly, blighted areas were obstacles to the economic
growth of the city. "A blighted area is one which has deteriorated from an
economic standpoint and therefore become less profitable to the city, the
general public and the owners of its real estate. Depreciation has set in and the
area is rapidly becoming a liability rather than an asset," argued planner Mabel
Walker. 78 Blight prevented the creation of a modem city, and blighted areas
were extremely difficult and expensive to cure. The problem, renewal
75. See JARED N. DAY, URBAN CASTLES: TENEMENT HOUSING AND LANDLORD ACTIVISM IN NEW
YORK CITY, 1890-1943, at 178 (1999).
76. On the rise of the real estate industry, see MARC WEISS, THE RISE OF THE COMMUNITY
BUILDERS: THE AMERICAN REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY AND URBAN LAND PLANNING (1987).
77. Hugh Potter, The Need for Federal Action in Rebuilding Cities, in 14 AMERICAN PLANNING &
CIVIC ANNUAL 175, 175 (Harlean James ed., 1943); see also WEISS, supra note 76, at 50-51 (discussing
conflicts within NAREB between real estate brokers and community builders); Gillette, supra note 74,
at 434 (discussing role of NAREB and ULI in promoting urban redevelopment efforts).
78. WALKER, supra note 57, at 6-7.
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advocates asserted, was that property owners often were unaware of the decline
of property values in their neighborhood, and there was a resulting
"discrepancy between the value placed upon the property by the owner and its
value for any uses to which it can be put."' 79 Owners, they argued, held on to
their properties "in the hope that by some miracle they may eventually get back
at least their original investment." 80 These "artificially high values," set by
naive (or speculative) property owners, made acquisition and clearance very
difficult.
81
Ethnic prejudice underlay much of the analysis of blighted areas,
particularly in New York City, where the majority of owners of apartment
buildings and small-scale commercial operations were immigrants. For
immigrant Jews and Italians, most of whom lacked formal education, tenement
ownership was a popular means of upward mobility, as was the operation of
garment factories and other businesses with low capital requirements. The
tenements they owned were often the oldest and most decrepit, and immigrant
landlords' neglect of these buildings was, according to one scholar, "a central
management principal" designed to lower costs and maximize profits.
8 2
Undercapitalized immigrant businesses also presented problems to urban elites
in their efforts to manage the city. While tenements were crucial to the housing
of the immigrant masses and small businesses were vital to their economic
survival, urban elites blamed apartment and industrial facilities for the creation
of blight.83
Small-scale, immigrant property owners, renewal advocates argued, were
not interested in the broader good of the city. They were speculators, persons
whose only goal was to make a fast buck regardless of the damage they did to
surrounding property values. "In certain spots," argued ULI President Hugh
Potter, "the high prices at which slum areas are held reveal the influence of
greed; the properties have been milked for years without repair." 84 Because
these immigrant landlords were inefficient and their interests speculative, their
79. Id. at 7; see also GUY GREER, YOUR CITY TOMORROW 103 (1947).
80. WALKER, supra note 57, at 6-7.
81. See COLEAN, supra note 70, at 79; Alfred Bettman, Federal and State Urban Redevelopment
Bills, in 14 AMERICAN PLANNING AND CivIc ANNUAL 166, 171 (Harlean James ed., 1943) [hereinafter
Bettman, Federal and State Urban Redevelopment Bills]; Alfred Bettman, Urban Redevelopment
Legislation, in 15 AMERICAN PLANNING AND CIVIC ANNUAL 51 (Harlean James ed., 1944) [hereinafter
Bettman, Urban Redevelopment Legislation].
82. DAY, supra note 75, at 33, 56.
83. On tenement landlords, see Donna Gabaccia, Little Italy's Decline: Immigrant Renters and
Investors in a Changing City, in LANDSCAPE OF MODERNITY: NEW YORK CITY, 1900-1940, at 235, 245
(David Ward & Olivier Zunz eds., 1992). On the role of small business in immigrant mobility, see
SUSAN GLENN, DAUGHTERS OF THE SHTETL: LIFE AND LABOR IN THE IMMIGRANT GENERATION (1990).
On efforts to restrict industrial development in Manhattan, see Keith D. Revell, Regulating the
Landscape: Real Estate Values, City Planning, and the 1916 Zoning Ordinance, in LANDSCAPE OF
MODERNITY: ESSAYS ON NEW YORK CITY, 1900-1940, at 28 (David Ward & Olivier Zunz eds., 1992).
84. Potter, supra note 77, at 175.
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property rights were not worthy of the same level of respect. Eminent domain
would pay them "fair value" and return the property to those who would use it
productively. In 1933, Herbert Nelson called for a "model state law helpfully
outlining a legal device for empowering proper units to rule out adverse uses
and effectively replan blighted areas." 85 Despite the obtuse wording of his
proposal, Nelson clearly envisioned expanded use of eminent domain for
redevelopment.
The purpose behind the designation of certain areas as blighted was clear.
Renewal advocates believed that the blighted land could be put to a "higher
use" under the right circumstances. One planner cited mid-town Manhattan as
an example of an area where "the height of the land, the frontage on the river,
and the growing transportation accessibility would make it a desirable location,
if it were not for the slum characteristics it has acquired., 86 Many blighted
areas supported viable businesses and provided affordable housing to working-
class persons. The problem with a blighted area, however, was that it was not
profitable enough-it did not produce enough tax revenues for the city, and it
did not create profit opportunities for those who most coveted the land. As
sociologist Scott Greer explained in his 1965 assessment of the urban renewal
program, the definition of blight was "simply that 'this land is too good for
these people.'
87
The changing terminology used to describe cities set the stage for the
implementation of urban renewal. Through the creation and explication of the
problem of blight, renewal advocates shifted the terms of the debate. The rights
of private property remained sacrosanct, but subject to new limitations. Not all
property owners were due the same respect. Those who held onto blighted
properties were acting against the public interest because their speculation and
inefficient management imperiled city residents and taxed the finances of city
government. Furthermore, the refusal of these owners to sell their properties at
"reasonable prices" prevented the rationalization of urban real estate and the
creation of modem cities. "It is a public use," D.C. reformer John Ihlder
declared in 1936, "to reclaim a slum or blighted area that is proving a
disastrous economic and social liability to its community., 88 To prevent further
damage to urban areas, eminent domain was necessary to wrest this land away
from these owners and to ensure that it was used more appropriately.
85. Herbert Nelson, Urban Housing andLand Use, I LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 158, 165 (1934).
86. WALKER, supra note 57, at 12; see also COLEAN, supra note 70, at 79.
87. GREER, supra note 10, at 31; see also GELFAND, supra note 11, at 108; TEAFORD, supra note
11, at 6. Hoover's committee on slums and blighted areas from the outset envisioned "the use of former
slum sites for the housing of higher income groups." PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE ON HOME BUILDING
AND HOMEOWNERSHIP, supra note 55, at 9.
88. John Ihlder & Maurice Brooks, Use of the Power of Eminent Domain in Slum Reclamation, 12
J. LAND & PUB. UTIL. ECON. 355, 360 (1936).
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III. PUBLIC HOUSING AND URBAN RENEWAL
The Great Depression provided the context for the beginnings of the
reconceptualization of the Public Use Clause, as the development of public
housing helped to legitimate urban renewal efforts. In 1934, at a time when
urban issues were considered particularly pressing, the first volume of Law and
Contemporary Problems devoted a special section to the question of urban
revitalization. Assessing the need to clear slum areas, Coleman Woodbury, then
Secretary of the Illinois State Housing Board, asserted that "those who see
housing as a major economic activity of the next generation will breathe more
easily if and when a few high state courts and the United States Supreme Court
clearly recognize housing as a public use." Until then, he concluded, "housing
development will go ahead very slowly...."89
The Great Depression devastated tenement landlords. Vacancies increased,
taxes rose, and new housing regulations increased maintenance costs. Most
tenements were bought on credit, and because many had changed hands in the
heated real estate market of the 1920s, mortgage payments on many properties
exceeded their income. As a result, tenement owners were not able to make
their loan payments. Many tenement owners lost their properties at foreclosure,
and institutional investors, along with city governments, became de facto slum
lords in many cities.
90
This crisis, however, created new opportunities for renewal advocates.
Many tenements were demolished because they were declared unsafe according
to recently established minimum standards of occupancy. In addition, the
consolidation of tax-delinquent buildings in the hands of corporations and
government made the clearance of large areas for redevelopment possible.
Property owners became increasingly amenable to condemnation as a means to
exit a failing market. Where they once opposed any government regulation,
landlords now wanted to be "bailed out" of their troubled investments. In
addition, the creation of the Homeowner's Loan Corporation, the Federal
Housing Administration, and other federal programs to support the real estate
industry further supported the rationalization of the real estate market. Large
corporations increasingly supplanted individual investors as owners of
apartment buildings. As a result, opportunities for large-scale redevelopment of
urban areas expanded.91
The acquisition of property by institutional investors also intensified the
push for government intervention in the real estate market. During the 1930s,
renewal advocates devised a variety of schemes to clear blighted areas. The
89. Coleman Woodbury, Land Assembly for Housing Developments, I LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
213,215 (1934).
90. See DAY, supra note 75, at 174-78.
91. See Gabaccia, supra note 83, at 246.
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Urban Land Institute (ULI), for example, proposed the creation of private
redevelopment agencies to spur redevelopment through slum condemnation
conducted by private corporations. Under the ULI plan, when these bodies
garnered the support of 75% of the owners in a designated area, the city could
condemn the land and pass it on to the agency. 92 Many government officials,
however, opposed such a wholesale transfer of government power to private
corporations and raised constitutional complaints over the appropriate uses of
eminent domain. In response, the real estate lobby altered its proposal to
envision a limited role for government in the redevelopment process and
proposed the creation of publicly managed "urban land commissions" to select
sites and condemn properties. The public agency, according to the plan, would
then have responsibility to dispose of the land to public or private entities.
93
This proposal also languished, however, as renewal advocates continued to face
legal and political opposition. A significant urban renewal program would not
be implemented until the 1940s.94
Violently opposed by real estate interests, public housing became,
ironically, the wedge for the expansion of slum clearance. Through the efforts
of director Harold Ickes, the Public Works Administration (PWA) implemented
the nation's first significant public housing program, and between 1934 and
1937, the PWA constructed more than 21,000 units of publicly-owned housing
for the working-class.9 5 To secure support for the program, Ickes agreed that
slum sites would be given priority for public housing developments.9 6 This
would enable real estate investors (particularly mortgage companies) to relieve
themselves of underperforming properties. Many housing reformers had pushed
for working-class housing in the suburbs and outlying areas of cities, believing
that these healthier surroundings would improve the social conditions of the
urban poor. Development in less densely populated areas would also be cheaper
and would allow the construction of more units. But Ickes believed that public
housing could provide shelter to the working-class and revitalize slums at the
same time. From that point on, public housing and urban renewal would be
intimately related.9 7
Despite Ickes's efforts to limit the real estate lobby's opposition, the public
92. GELFAND, supra note 11, at 113-15.
93. See BOYER, supra note 53, at 252-53; GREER, supra note 79, at 107-08; Louis JUSTEMENT,
NEW CITIES FOR OLD: CITY BUILDING IN TERMS OF SPACE, TIME, AND MONEY 29-30 (1946); URBAN
LAND INSTITUTE, A PROPOSAL FOR REBUILDING BLIGHTED CITY AREAS (1943); Urban Development
Principles Restated, 6 URB. LAND, Mar. 1947, at 3.
94. Land clearance in cities, however, did increase dramatically during the New Deal, as local
governments, funded by the Public Works Administration and the Works Progress Administration,
implemented public projects like bridges, tunnels, and other government facilities. These projects
dislocated thousands of city residents. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 46-47.
95. See RADFORD, supra note 11, at 100-01.
96. See id. at 101-02.
97. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 25-26; Carol Aronivici, Housing the Poor: Mirage or Reality,
1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 148 (1934).
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housing program quickly came under legal attack. In the early battles over the
New Deal, as conservative courts struggled to rein in the Roosevelt
Administration, the government's eminent domain powers were once again
contested. In 1935, a federal district judge in western Kentucky ruled that
public housing did not meet the requirements of the Public Use Clause and
98denied the PWA the right to condemn land for housing projects. Relying on
late nineteenth century precedents, the judge construed the Public Use Clause
narrowly and concluded that the agency could only condemn property for
facilities that provided equal access to all citizens.99 Public housing, with a
limited number of units and a detailed screening process for tenants, did not
meet this requirement.
If the property of the citizen can be condemned and taken.., simply because the
legislative department ... may determine that the use to which this property is to be
put is for the general welfare, the property of every citizen in this country would be
subject to the whims and theories of any temporary majority.
The court further commented that a broad interpretation of the Clause
would inevitably make the courts the arbiters of public use, denying the right of
legislatures to make policy. "The action of the courts in such cases would
inevitably reflect the individual views of the judges." Better, he concluded, to
have "a fixed and definite guide."
101
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the holding, concluding that "the taking of one
citizen's property for the purpose of improving it and selling or leasing it to
another.., is not, in our opinion, within the scope of the powers of the federal
government."' 2 While public housing officials wanted to contest the issue in
the Supreme Court, President Roosevelt's advisors decided not to pursue the
case further. Government officials worried that the case would provide an
opportunity for the conservative Supreme Court to gut much of the economic
recovery effort. As a result, the federal program was limited to projects that the
PWA could build without the use of eminent domain.1
0 3
The year following the ruling, Congress passed the Wagner Housing Act,
which created the United States Housing Authority and replaced federal
construction with a system of subsidy for local housing authorities.'0 4 The Act
caused a dramatic expansion in public housing across the nation, as almost
98. United States v. Certain Lands in Louisville, 9 F. Supp. 137 (1935), affd, 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir.
1935), appeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 726 (1936).
99. Id. at 140.
100. Certain Lands in Louisville, 9 F. Supp. at 138; see also HENDERSON, supra note 26, at 71-72;
Ira S. Robbins, The Use of Eminent Domain for Housing Purposes, in HOUSING OFFICIALS YEARBOOK
1936, at 116 (Coleman Woodbury ed., 1936).
101. Certain Lands in Louisville, 9 F. Supp. at 139.
102. Certain Lands in Louisville, 78 F.2d at 688.
103. See HENDERSON, supra note 26, at 71; RADFORD, supra note 11, at 103.
104. United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, § 11, 50 Stat. 893 (1937) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 1437 (1994)).
Vol. 21:1, 2003
The "Public Menace" of Blight
every state approved legislation authorizing the creation of local housing
authorities to secure federal funding. The bill also supported the goals of
renewal advocates by specifically linking public housing construction to slum
clearance and requiring each housing authority to demolish or repair as many
"substandard" units as it built.10 5
Public housing was also attacked in state courts, but unlike the Sixth
Circuit, most state judges gave wide discretion to local agencies to use eminent
domain for public housing. As it did in many areas of twentieth century legal
reform, New York led the way in reinterpreting the Public Use Clause. 10 6 The
state had authorized a public housing program before the passage of the
Wagner Act, and the newly created New York City Housing Authority
(NYCHA) fought the legal battles over eminent domain concurrently with the
WPA. In a holding that contrasted distinctly with the Sixth Circuit, New York's
Court of Appeals approved the condemnation of properties by the NYCHA.
The court relied heavily on the argument that slum clearance was an integral
part of public housing production and declared that "slum areas are the
breeding places of disease which take toll not only on its denizens, but, by
spread, from the inhabitants of the entire city and state."'10 7 The elimination of
these areas through the construction of public housing, the court ruled,
constituted a valid public purpose.
Other courts followed New York's direction in approving the use of
condemnation for public housing, and slum clearance played an important role
in many of these cases. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts stated that if the
construction of housing for low-income persons were the "sole object of the
statute we might have more difficulty. ' 0 8 But the court distinguished the
state's public housing act from prior attempts to subsidize housing that it had
rejected. An earlier proposed statute, the court argued, "contained no provision
for the eradication of the sources of disease and danger. It was not a slum
clearance law."'1 9 Because slums were a "public nuisance," the court concluded
that their destruction was a valid use of eminent domain.1 10
In authorizing the condemnation of land for public housing, state courts
shifted public use jurisprudence. In most prior cases, courts had examined the
105. Id.; see also RADFORD, supra note 11, at 103.
106. On New York's central role in changing interpretations of the Public Use Clause and other
legal doctrines, see NELSON, supra note 48.
107. N.Y. City Housing Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153, 154 (N.Y. 1936); see also HENDERSON,
supra note 26, at 72-75; NELSON, supra note 48, at 258-59.
108. Allydon Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Auth., 23 N.E.2d 665, 668 (Mass. 1939).
109. Id. at 669.
110. Id; see also Doman v. Phila. Housing Auth., 200 A. 834, 841 (Penn. 1934) ("[T]he
elimination of unsafe and dilapidated tenements is a legitimate object for the exercise of the police
power."). Public housing cases are cited in Stephen A. Reisenfeld & Warren Eastlund, Public Aid to
Housing and Land Redevelopment, 34 MINN. L. REV. 610, 634-35 (1950). See also Meidinger, supra
note 14, at 33-34.
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intended future use of the condemned property and determined whether that use
was in the public interest. In Muller and its progeny, courts looked instead to
the state of the property before condemnation. Since the destruction of
tenements and other substandard buildings would eliminate noxious conditions
in the area, courts reasoned, eminent domain provided a public benefit. By
altering their methods for determining what constituted a public use, courts
lessened the importance of the ultimate disposition of the property in their
considerations. This shift would be crucial in considerations of the legality of
urban renewal." 1
The approval of local public housing by state courts provided strong
precedents for urban renewal advocates who wanted to exercise the powers of
eminent domain for the benefit of private developers. Public housing, however,
was not identical to the programs promoted by renewal advocates. Unlike
renewal efforts driven by private real estate interests, public housing projects
would be owned by local government and leased to tenants. While public
housing opinions were favorable to the cause, urban renewal required a further
expansion of the public use doctrine. World War II-era concerns about the
future of American society provided a platform for promoting such change.
IV. PLANNING A MODERN CITY
During the Great Depression, planners secured a prominent position in
discussions over the economic and social development of the country. The
Tennessee Valley Authority was only the largest of many significant
development projects in which planners played an important role. During
World War II, national planning took on still greater urgency, and federal
agencies presented numerous post-war plans for the creation of new systems of
transportation, sanitation, and the development of natural resources. Through
the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB) as well as state, regional, and
local planning commissions, planners lobbied for comprehensive programs to
reorganize cities, suburbs, and rural areas. "The war has given a new intensity
to thinking about the future of cities," argued NRPB Chair Charles Ascher.
"Let us not quail before the magnitude of the task."
'"12
The movement for comprehensive planning received a boost from
111. Though the Court of Appeals did not cite it, the Muller decision is similar in its reasoning to
the Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). There, the Court approved a
Virginia law that directed owners of red cedar trees to cut them down in order to protect the state's apple
orchards from the "cedar rust" disease.
112. Charles Ascher, Better Cities After the War, 57 THE AM. CITY, June 1942, at 55. For more on
post-war planning and redevelopment efforts, see NAT'L RESOURCES PLAN. BD., NATIONAL RESOURCES
DEVELOPMENT REPORT FOR 1943 (1943); NAT'L RESOURCES PLAN. BD., POST-WAR PLANNING (1942);
W.E. REYNOLDS, POST-WAR URBAN REDEVELOPMENT (1946); SCOTT, supra note 53, at 397-400; City
Planning Merges into National Planning, 48 THE AM. CITY, Nov. 1939, at 65; and Frederic A. Delano,
Must Urban Redevelopment Wait on Bombing?, 56 THE AM. CITY, May 1941, at 35.
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economists worried that the end of the war would push the economy back into
depression. During the conflict, Harvard economist Alvin Hansen and Federal
Reserve advisor Guy Greer published several influential reports in which they
argued that the nation needed a full-scale plan for post-war conversion to
maintain employment levels and prevent economic crisis. Hansen and Greer
focused in particular on slum clearance and urban redevelopment as methods to
keep workers busy after the war. They recommended that each city and region
develop a "Master Plan" for its area. 13 Seconding the proposal, Ascher argued
that after the war ended the country could "seize what may be a unique
opportunity to remold our cities, to provide a creative, healthful and satisfying
living and working environment for a people afforded economic security by
full employment."'1 14 The creation of a modem city, Hansen argued, required
"far-reaching changes in state laws" to give cities "adequate legal power ... to
control the use of their land areas." These changes were to be "brought about
mainly by the pressure of public opinion."
11 5
During the 1940s, renewal advocates took their case to the public. In
pamphlets, radio addresses, "futuramas," and other media, they argued that
cities could be revitalized through public/private partnerships. These programs,
with the use of eminent domain, would provide public benefits by eliminating
the decrepit urban core and replacing it with a gleaming modem city. Cities
across the country organized commissions to prepare blueprints for the post-
World War II era. Some, including Cincinnati, Portland, Dallas, and Detroit,
drafted comprehensive plans for their cities. These documents established
zoning districts, created stronger building standards, recommended changes in
city infrastructure, and sought to create an orderly system for future growth."
16
While some cities approved master plans, others like New York drafted more
practical initiatives of public works aimed at renewing slum areas while
providing construction jobs. Business leaders, politicians, and planning
professionals cooperated in this process, and their efforts were promoted by
private coalitions of civic leaders such as the Allegheny Conference in
Pittsburgh, the Municipal Housing and Planning Council of Chicago, and the
Citizen's Council on City Planning in Philadelphia (CCCP). These groups were
controlled by the economic elite of each city, and their goal was to protect their
urban investments by securing public support for government-assisted
113. See ALVIN H. HANSEN & GUY GREER, URBAN REDEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING (1945).
114. Ascher, supra note 112, at 55.
115. Alvin H. Hansen, The City of the Future, 32 NAT'L MUN. REV. 68, 70 (1943).
116. For examples of master plans, see ROBERT E. ALEXANDER & DRAYTON S. BRYANT,
REBUILDING A CITY: A STUDY OF REDEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS IN Los ANGELES (1951); EDWARD M.
BASSETT, THE MASTER PLAN (1938); CINCINNATI CITY PLANNING COMMISSION, THE CINCINNATI
METROPOLITAN MASTER PLAN (1948); DETROIT CITY PLAN COMMISSION, THE DETROIT MASTER PLAN
(1951); GEORGE B. GALLOWAY, POSTWAR PLANNING IN THE UNITED STATES (1942); and T.J. KENT,
JR., THE URBAN GENERAL PLAN (1964).
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redevelopment. " 
7
But businessmen were not the only advocates of renewal. Liberal groups
were active participants in this project. The CCCP, founded in 1943 to
"facilitate citizen participation in city planning and to further the science of city
planning in Philadelphia," included in its membership the Association of
Philadelphia Settlements, the Central Labor Union, the Inter-racial Committee
of Germantown, and the local branch of the NAACP. Civic associations across
the country promoted a revitalization program in which local agencies
condemned properties, cleared them, and turned them over to private entities
for redevelopment. These proposals required significant subsidies to be viable,
and city leaders lobbied local, state, and federal governments to fund their
118
programs.
To garner public aid, urban elites took several steps. In New York City,
Mayor LaGuardia took to the radio and the stump to promote his postwar
public works program. "There will always be a New York City," LaGuardia
stated, and, therefore, planning for the postwar period was "of the utmost
importance."''1 9 In several cities, including Chicago and Detroit, renewal
advocates sponsored forums and advertising campaigns aimed at eliciting
resident backing. One of the most dynamic tactics to rouse public interest was
sponsored by the CCCP. In 1947, the group created the "Better Philadelphia
Exhibit," a multi-media presentation of its vision for a modern city. Thousands
of people paid a dollar each to visit the exhibit at Gimbel's department store.
There they saw designs for modern housing, read plans for updated
infrastructure, and listened to testimony from public officials in support of
Philadelphia's rebirth. The most popular part of the exhibit was a scale model
of downtown Philadelphia, a vision of the city in the year 2000 that featured
modem buildings, transportation, and residences.'
20
In many cities, advocates published pamphlets to educate the public on the
need for urban renewal and comprehensive planning. Two such documents
were Metropolitan Los Angeles, written by Mel Scott, and Tomorrow's
Chicago, by Arthur Hillman and Robert Casey. 12 1 Both pamphlets were
supported by local elites-Metropolitan Los Angeles was funded by the John
Randolph and Dora Haynes Foundation and Tomorrow's Chicago by the
Metropolitan Housing and Planning Council and the Field Foundation-and
117. See TEAFORD, supra note 11, at 50.
118. Seeid.at5l-52.
119. N.Y. CITY PLAN. COMM'N, PROPOSED POSTWAR WORKS PROGRAM FOR THE CITY OF NEW
YORK ii (1942); see also N.Y. OFF. OF THE CITY CONSTR. COORDINATOR, PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAM:
PROGRESS REPORT AS OF JANUARY 1, 1949 (1949); NEW YORK ADVANCING (Rebecca B. Rankin ed.,
1945).
120. See TEAFORD, supra note 11, at 52; JOHN BAUMAN, PUBLIC HOUSING, RACE, AND RENEWAL:
URBAN PLANNING IN PHILADELPHIA, 1920-1974 (1987).
121. HILLMAN & CASEY, supra note 66; SCOTT, supra note 65; see also MEL SCOTT, CITIES ARE
FOR PEOPLE: THE LOS ANGELES REGION PLANS FOR LIVING (1942); Beauregard, supra note 53, at 384.
Vol. 21 :1, 2003
The "Public Menace" of Blight
they sought to foster broad support for urban revitalization. Incremental
programs of rehabilitation and social services, these pamphlets argued, could
not alleviate the structural defects of American cities. The only solution, they
concluded, was the clearance of blighted areas and the creation of planned
developments that would revitalize the city.
With clearance accomplished, Metropolitan Los Angeles envisioned the
creation of a region of low-density, single-family houses in well-planned
communities. Each would have a combination of professional, commercial,
recreational facilities and industry providing employment to area residents. The
freeway would support the creation of these small communities by "divid[ing]
the area into cells" that would become the "well-organized communities ... of
the future."' 122 In Chicago, planners envisioned a central city that, once cleared,
would be opened up into "superblocks" one-fourth square mile in area. Each
community within the newly organized city would have a school and park in
the center, and clusters of high and low-rise apartment buildings would
surround the central square. Single-family houses would be grouped around
smaller play areas, and shopping and parking would be close by.
Neighborhoods would be "linked together by a flowing system of broad
boulevards and green spaces." Industrial areas, buffered by "green belts,"
would be easily accessible.1 23 With a master plan "as we build and rebuild, we
would leave the right places vacant, and what we build would be where it
belongs," argued Tomorrow's Chicago.124 The modem city would be efficient
and would enable residents to live more productively.
Renewal advocates argued that government intervention was necessary to
make their vision of urban revitalization a reality. Condemnation had to be used
to secure properties from people who stood in the way of the modem city.
Eminent domain powers and government subsidy were needed because "most
blighted properties are valued at far more than their real worth-and at more
than private enterprise could afford to pay a development agency for them."
' 125
Government could also lower acquisition costs through eminent domain and
thereby provide incentives for redevelopment. Responding to criticism that
such a program would rescue the bad investments of property owners,
advocates argued that redevelopment would be "a process of strengthening
municipal fiscal structure and of giving us more orderly and livable
communities. Incidentally, and as an inescapable by-product of all this, it
would 'bail out' distressed property." But this would be "a minute part of its
total effect."'
126
122. SCOrr, supra note 65, at 95.
123. HILLMAN & CASEY, supra note 66, at 140-41.
124. Id. at 146.
125. SCOTT, supra note 65, at 110.
126. Potter, supra note 77, at 178-79.
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With government assistance, these slum and blighted areas could be
transformed into new modem communities with amenities that would attract
middle-income persons. Renewal advocates envisioned the clearance of areas
large enough to construct neighborhood developments "sufficiently large to
resemble small towns." 127 These newly created areas of the city would have
lower population densities, more community spaces, and traffic patterns
organized to support business while protecting residential areas. "In a way, it is
a plan to bring suburban advantages to the center of the city," argued
Tomorrow's Chicago.128 Urban renewal would counter the lure of the suburbs
and place cities in a more competitive position to attract residents.'
29
But none of this would be possible without legal reform. Advocates used
these pamphlets and other publicly-disseminated documents to justify the
increasing power of the state in the private market. "[S]ome citizens," the
author of Metropolitan Los Angeles granted, "hold the opinion that planning for
a whole metropolitan area is undemocratic-that it smacks of totalitarianism or
some other form of control from the top down, in contrast to our ideal of action
from the grass roots upward."' 130 But planning in the United States, advocates
argued, was a democratic process, based on the sanctity of individual rights.
"When there is comprehensive planning and control of land use, private-
property rights are generally made more secure. Landowners have some
protection against sudden and chaotic change in their own areas and those
adjoining," concluded Tomorrow's Chicago.13 1 Public/private cooperation
would provide the means to ensure that property values were maintained.
Planning professionals also argued that the completion of a comprehensive
master plan provided a public benefit that countered concerns about the abuse
of eminent domain powers. "Nothing is unconstitutional until the courts make it
so," claimed Alfred Bettman, a leading advocate of master plans and urban
redevelopment. Bettman argued that, while some people believed that the urban
renewal scheme violated the Public Use Clause, there was no reason to believe
that the courts would not approve a "carefully drawn measure, rational in its
conceptions, genuine in its details, administered with intelligence and integrity,
and which meets a real social and economic evil which, by its very nature,
cannot be reached without public action of this nature. ,132 The creation of
modem neighborhoods would provide an appropriate application of the Public
Use Clause, he asserted.
127. HILLMAN & CASEY, supra note 66, at 72.
128. Id. at 73.
129. Id.
130. SCOTr, supra note 65, at 165.
131. HILLMAN & CASEY, supra note 66, at 163.
132. Bettman, Urban Redevelopment Legislation, supra note 81, at 60; see also Report of the
Committee on Urban Redevelopment, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PLANNING
250 (American Society of Planning Officials, 1941).
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While most renewal advocates argued that urban renewal was legally
permissible under then-current interpretations of the doctrine, other advocates
flatly stated that the primacy of property rights must be superseded and that the
narrow interpretation of the Public Use Clause was unsuited to modem urban
problems. "[I]t has become clear beyond question," argued Guy Greer, "that the
rights of individual property ownership can no longer be considered absolute:
they must be modified to avoid destruction of the rights of the community at
large."'133 Condemnation would provide owners with the fair value of their
property and improve urban neighborhoods for all residents. By making the
elimination of blight vital to the survival of the city, advocates avoided
questions about who benefited from the condemnation process and who bore
the costs. Although many city residents objected to the taking of their
properties, the discourse of blight, emanating from seemingly objective
professionals, obscured the debate over urban revitalization programs.
The development of the discourse of blight reflected an evolution in the
proper uses of eminent domain. Eminent domain in the nineteenth century was
used primarily to secure undeveloped land. By the late 1 800s, condemnation of
improved land was an important part of city building, used for bridges, utilities,
transportation, and other types of infrastructure. The use of eminent domain
was not new to post-war America, but the urban renewal scheme was
nevertheless novel, both in form and scope. It authorized the transfer of land
from one group of private owners to another group that would use it for
practically the same purposes, and it envisioned the transfer of large amounts of
real estate in an effort to reshape the urban landscape. Urban renewal was a
major undertaking that required not only vast amounts of funding but also an
alteration of the relationship between property owners and the state. By
advocating a reinterpretation of the Public Use Clause and cementing the
discourse of blight, widely disseminated pamphlets like Metropolitan Los
Angeles and Tomorrow's Chicago were crucial to the adoption of the program.
Through their rhetoric, these documents explained the public purpose behind
these private transfers and helped mute concerns about the expansive powers
that the program created.1
34
V. PUBLIC RENEWAL AND PRIVATE BENEFIT
By the 1940s, renewal advocates had created a detailed program for urban
revitalization. The basic tenets of urban renewal held that in order to protect
property values and promote the efficient growth of urban areas, cities needed a
comprehensive plan for redevelopment. The plan would designate the areas to
133. GREER, supra note 79, at 116.
134. For a discussion of these efforts to secure public support, see CHARLES W. ELIOT, CITIZEN
SUPPORT FOR Los ANGELES DEVELOPMENT (1945).
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be reclaimed and what types of projects would be built in each district. The
actual development would be conducted privately, but the government would
be an important partner. To keep acquisition costs down, eminent domain
powers, along with government subsidies, were necessary. 135 Throughout the
decade, renewal advocates lobbied the public to support their program. As
experimental renewal programs began and the discourse of blight turned from
theory to reality, the limitations of the terminology became clear. Developers
selected properties not because they were run down, but because they were
profitably attractive. Moreover, politicians and institutional leaders used
redevelopment programs to serve other goals like the restriction of mobility for
blacks.
During the 1940s, a majority of states passed redevelopment acts. New
York state was the first to pass urban renewal legislation in 1941, followed by
Illinois, and by 1948 twenty-five states had similar laws.' 36 These laws
authorized the creation of locally-chartered organizations with the authority to
condemn and clear blighted areas that would then be privately redeveloped.
The programs varied in their particulars-some acts authorized the creation of
private organizations to condemn properties, while others vested that
responsibility in a newly created public agency or in the area's public housing
administration. Some redevelopment acts authorized the use of tax incentives to
promote revitalization, and one (Illinois) provided grants to subsidize
developments. Most demanded the submission of comprehensive plans for the
designated areas, and many required that the plans be approved by the local
planning commission. Despite these particular differences among
redevelopment plans, however, they did share one important requirement: all
required that, after land was set aside for public infrastructure, the cleared
property be transferred to private developers.
Eminent domain powers were the most significant facet of these
redevelopment acts. The District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 was
typical. Passed by Congress after lobbying from several groups, including the
American Society of Planning Officials and the Urban Land Institute, it
declared that, "owing to technological and sociological changes, obsolete lay-
out, and other factors, conditions existing in the District of Columbia with
respect to substandard housing and blighted areas.., are injurious to the public
health, safety, morals, and welfare. ' 137 The legislation further concluded that
redevelopment could not be attained by "the ordinary operations of private
135. See Bettman, Federal and State Urban Redevelopment Legislation, supra note 81, at 168.
136. See JUSTEMENT, supra note 93, at 29-30; SCOTr, supra note 53, at 424-25; see also Bettman,
Federal and State Urban Redevelopment Bills, supra note 81, at 166 (discussing legislation pending in
1943); Thomas Desmond, Blighted Areas Get a New Chance, 30 NAT'L MUN. REv. 629, 629-32 (1941)
(discussing New York's Desmond-Mitchell Urban Redevelopment Corporation Law).
137. District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, ch. 736, § 2, 60 Stat. 790 (1946) (current
version at D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-301.01 (2001)).
Vol. 21:1, 2003
The "Public Menace" of Blight
enterprise" and made the legislative determination that "the acquisition and the
assembly of real property and the leasing or sale thereof for redevelopment"
was a "public use."' 38 Other state acts also emphasized the importance of
eminent domain and included specific provisions to convince the courts that
their programs were constitutional. When New York amended its act in 1942 to
allow insurance companies to invest in housing projects, it declared that the
condemnation of blighted areas for the development of housing was a "superior
public use," giving urban renewal projects priority even when local
governments considered using sites to build schools, parks, or other public
works. 1 
39
Despite much legislative activity, only two major renewal projects
commenced in the early 1940s-Pittsburgh's redevelopment of the Golden
Triangle, which eliminated an industrial district in the oldest section of the city
and replaced it with office buildings, and Metropolitan Life Insurance's
Stuyvesant Town, which cleared the east side of Manhattan between 1 4 th and
23rd streets for residential construction. The Stuyvesant project required the
uprooting of 11,000 working-class families so that they could be replaced by
8,756 middle-class families. Stuyvesant Town was a harbinger of problems to
come as urban renewal expanded its scope. Lewis Mumford called the project
"prefabricated blight" and condemned its high density and lack of public
amenities (including its lack of schools). 140 Others complained that the project,
with rents too high for the working-class residents dislocated by the clearance
of the area, added to New York's wartime housing shortage. African-
Americans bridled at the comments of Metropolitan Life Insurance Chairman
Frederick Ecker, who defended the company's decision to deny admission to
blacks by declaring that "blacks and whites just don't mix."' 141 But most of New
York's political, business, and civic leadership supported the project
wholeheartedly, and most housing reformers, though they expressed concern
over the dislocation of the poor, also welcomed the development. Desperate to
clear blighted areas, these elites argued that tough choices had to be made.
142
The majority of people uprooted for Stuyvesant Town were white, but soon
urban renewal would set its sights on the black ghetto. While race was always
central to definitions of blight, after the great migrations of World War II, race
played an increasingly important role in city planning. By the mid-1940s, the
expanding minority black and Latino ghettos were the main concern of
business leaders and urban politicians. In 1950, for example, the Los Angeles
138. Id.
139. See HENDERSON, supra note 26, at 126.
140. Lewis Mumford, Prefabricated Blight, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 30, 1948, at 49, 54.
141. Charles Abrams, The Walls of Stuyvesant Town, THE NATION, Mar. 24, 1945, at 328.
142. On Pittsburgh's first project, see JEANNE LOWE, CITIES IN A RACE WITH TIME 126-44 (1965);
and TEAFORD, supra note 11, at 108. The Stuyvesant Town controversy is discussed in detail in
HENDERSON, supra note 26, at 122-45; and SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 84-107.
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City Planning Commission designated eleven areas as blighted. All but one of
them had a population that was majority Mexican-American or African-
American. 143 Chicago, according to city planners, had the largest blighted
central areas of any city in the United States, over twenty square miles. The
area selected almost completely overlay Chicago's "black belt" on the
Southside and included many rapidly changing areas on the Westside.4
Because of its increasing concern over the expansion of the black ghetto,
Chicago became a leader in the slum clearance movement. While white
neighborhoods to the south of the ghetto responded violently to the arrival of
black neighbors, Chicago's elites were more subtle in their reactions to
neighborhood change. After World War II, business leaders from downtown
department stores and financial institutions joined with major nonprofit
organizations, including the University of Chicago and the Illinois Institute of
Technology (liT), to respond to the encroachment of the ghetto. These elites
were concerned that their investments were imperiled by the growth of black
Chicago, and they sought to renew the areas surrounding downtown to make
them attractive to middle-income people. "We have two choices, either to run
away from the blight or to stand and fight," argued Henry Heald, IIT's
president. 145 Rallying behind the slogan "Stand and Fight" and led by Heald,
realtor Fred Kramer, and businessman Holman Pettibone, business and
institutional leaders embarked on the revitalization of the inner city. 146
In 1947, pushed by this coalition, Chicago Mayor Martin Kennelly reached
an agreement with New York Life Insurance Company to build the "Lake
Meadows" development on the near Southside. While much of the proposed
clearance area was deteriorated, New York Life created a controversy when it
demanded that several well-maintained blocks be cleared because they would
afford the project better views of the lake. Even redevelopment advocates
acknowledged that the plan ignored "actual slum areas completely" and
planned "the demolition of a well-kept Negro area where the bulk of property is
resident owned, its taxes paid, and its maintenance above par."'147 Residents
argued that the area was not a slum and that they were "being wrongfully
ousted from the land where they have invested thousands of dollars in upkeep
and improvements.' 48 Protesters further asserted that the project was "'Negro
clearance' rather than slum clearance" and said, "If it is a slum clearance
143. ALEXANDER & BRYANT, supra note 116, at 38.
144. See HILLMAN & CASEY, supra note 66, at 70; CHI. PLAN COMM'N, HOUSING GOALS FOR
CHICAGO 62 (1946). For a fuller discussion of the use of urban renewal in reshaping the racial landscape
of American cities, see HIRSCH, supra note 12; and SUGRUE, supra note 12.
145. METRO. HOUSING & PLAN. COUNCIL, RECLAIMING CHICAGO'S BLIGHTED AREAS (1946).
146. See HIRSCH, supra note 12, at 102-05.
147. Id. at 125.
148. Citizens Hold Huge Rally to Block Land Grab, PITTSBURGH COURIER, June 25, 1949.
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program, then let's make it that and start where the slums are." 149 Although
their complaints delayed the project, these efforts ultimately did not stop the
clearance of the area.
The Lake Meadows development was a success in providing middle-class
housing to Chicagoans (unlike most renewal projects the new tenants were also
black), and the clearance of the area also enabled local institutions like lIT to
expand their facilities. At the same time, the project replaced only a small
percentage of the units that were demolished and exacerbated the severe
housing shortage in the city. Excluded from many areas, poor blacks
increasingly relied on the units of the Chicago Housing Authority for shelter.
As a result, the hopes of housing officials to maintain integration in Chicago's
public projects were dashed. In addition, the dislocation caused by the Lake
Meadows project increased pressure on other neighborhoods, heightened
tensions between blacks and whites, and accelerated neighborhood decline in
other areas of the Southside.
50
Lake Meadows, Stuyvesant Town, and Pittsburgh's Golden Triangle
received national attention as models for urban redevelopment, but they were
the only achievements that renewal advocates could claim during the 1940s.
Despite the acceptance of the need for redevelopment and the passage of state
laws to support such efforts, major obstacles to renewal remained. The
condemnation process was cumbersome and many property owners fought their
ejection. Because urban renewal laws were untested in most states, struggles
over condemnation went all the way to state supreme courts. In addition,
renewal area residents, who were typically poor and politically weak, still
elicited support in their efforts to save their neighborhoods. Furthermore, the
tax credits authorized by most state acts were not enough to excite the interest
of private developers. Even though renewal advocates believed slum properties
could be put to a "higher use," planning principles (which required lower
density development) would result in lower returns in renewal areas.'
51
Therefore, advocates argued, redevelopment required government
financing. "Private enterprise will not be able to redevelop property on the
basis of the present cost of acquisition unless the excessive valuations are
written off by means of either tax exemptions or direct subsidies," argued
developer Louis Justement, whose views were seconded by the National
Association of Housing Officials and the NAREB."' But cities and stateslacked the resources for a significant renewal program, and as renewal efforts
149. Housing Project Hangs Fire: Charges 'Clearance' of Negroes is Aim, CHI. DEFENDER, May
7, 1949, at 4.
150. See HIRSCH, supra note 12, at 122-23.
151. See GELFAND, supra note 11, at 116-17; GREER, supra note 79, at 111; JUSTEMENT, supra
note 93, at 54-59; MOLLENKOPF, supra note 10, at 79-80.
152. JUSTEMENT, supra note 93, at 54.
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stalled, advocates increased their focus on the federal government. National
subsidies, they argued, were necessary to revitalize cities. "It is no more than
equitable that the credit of the federal government be applied to the reclamation
of eroded urban land," argued ULI President Hugh Potter. 153 "The cities need
not feel like paupers going hat-in-hand to a source of bounty in seeking the use
of such credit for they contain in large measure the sources from which it is
drawn.' '154 Throughout the 1940s, the NAREB and other lobby groups used
such arguments in advocating for the passage of federal legislation to support
urban redevelopment. 1
55
Several senators agreed. In 1945, Senators Robert Taft, Allen Ellender, and
Robert Wagner introduced a comprehensive housing act. Their proposal
combined funding for additional public housing with subsidies to lower the
costs of acquisition in slum clearance sites. Under Title I of the bill, the federal
government would pay two-thirds of the cost of purchasing and clearing
renewal areas. While many groups supported the bill, it languished for four
years because of NAREB opposition. Real estate interests certainly wanted
government aid for renewal efforts, but they were so adamantly opposed to the
public housing included in the legislation that they would not support the bill.
After his election in 1949, President Truman made urban housing a centerpiece
of his "Fair Deal," and the bill finally passed. The Housing Act of 1949
promoted the elimination of substandard and other inadequate housing through
the clearance of slums and blighted areas, and the realization as soon as feasible
of the goal of "a decent home and a suitable living environment for every
American family" through public and private construction. 1
56
The bill was a high point of post-war liberalism, representing the largest
commitment in American history to aid the unfortunate through publicly-
subsidized housing. But it was vague about how this goal was to be met. The
810,000 units of public housing authorized in the legislation fell far short of the
demand, and Congress failed to fund even that low target. By linking urban
renewal to the program, the Housing Act of 1949 ultimately displaced many
thousands more families than it housed, and the bill had only weak protections
for the people dislocated by renewal efforts. These flaws would become evident
as the program was implemented, but at the time, the Act was hailed by
housing reformers and city planners as a means to restore cities to their central
153. Potter, supra note 77, at 177.
154. Id.
155. See Bettman, Federal and State Urban Redevelpment Bills, supra note 81, at 166-71; Arthur
Binns, Report of the Committee on Housing and Blighted Areas of the National Association of Real
Estate Boards, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PLANNING, 1941, at 153-55
(American Society of Planning Officials, 1941); Nat'l Ass'n of Housing Officials, Subsidy and Taxation
for Urban Redevelopment, 59 THE AM. CITY, June 1944, at 76.
156. See GELFAND, supra note 11, at 115; GREER, supra note 79, at 112-15.
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place in American life.
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VI. THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF URBAN RENEWAL
Mid-century saw urban renewal projects planned or underway in cities
across the nation. New York remained the leader in urban renewal, with several
major developments in progress. In the post-war years, the combination of
public housing, highway, and urban renewal projects undertaken by the city's
redevelopment czar Robert Moses changed the face of whole neighborhoods.
Though the uprooting of residents in clearance areas had been a concern before,
the extent of New York's program made relocation a major problem. The City
Planning Commission estimated that, between 1946 and 1953, more than
250,000 people were uprooted in the city. Hundreds of apartment buildings,
stores, factories, and warehouses were condemned in pursuit of New York's
modernization.1
58
Despite the dislocation of thousands across the country, urban renewal was
accepted as a necessity by 1950. Commenting on redevelopment plans in the
southwest section of Washington, D.C., the Post portrayed the issue as one of
"Progress or Decay" and stated bluntly that "Washington Must Choose."
159
Only redevelopment, the paper argued, could stop the "headlong flight to the
suburbs."' 60 The New York Times, assessing the nation's largest urban renewal
program, stated that change was inevitable and celebrated the efforts of the
"municipal surgeons" who performed "a series of operations" to revive the
city. 16 1 Despite the serious impact it had on many residents, urban renewal was
widely viewed as the only answer to the decline of the city.
Faced with a clear crisis in cities, only a few policy-makers expressed
concerns about the possible abuse of eminent domain powers. New York
housing reformer Charles Abrams was one. "In my opinion, under present
redevelopment laws, Macy's could condemn Gimbels-if Robert Moses gave
the word," Abrams argued. 162 But even Abrams believed that condemnation
was necessary-his complaint was that the power was wielded
undemocratically. Civil rights activists also struggled to balance competing
concerns in the debate over urban renewal. In his 1948 book The Negro Ghetto,
157. See GELFAND, supra note 11, at 154-55; HALPERN, supra note 74, at 65; MOLLENKOPF, supra
note 10, at 79-80; SCOTT, supra note 53, at 460-67; TEAFORD, supra note 11, at 107.
158. See ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK
965-68 (1974).
159. HOWARD GILLETTE JR., BETWEEN JUSTICE AND BEAUTY: RACE, PLANNING AND THE FAILURE
OF URBAN POLICY IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 156 (1995) (discussing a series of Washington Post articles
promoting redevelopment).
160. Id. at 156.
161. SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 252.
162. HENDERSON, supra note 26, at 20. In New York, the only group that consistently supported
uprooted homeowners and tenants was the leftist American Labor Party. Their influence declined
dramatically during the anti-Communist hysteria of the 1950s. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 195.
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Robert Weaver (later to become the first HUD Secretary) argued that urban
renewal presented a "threat or an opportunity" to African-Americans. 163 He
worried that the program would be used to entrench racial segregation and
prevent blacks from moving into new areas. While Weaver's fears were borne
out in the early 1950s, he continued to support the principle of urban renewal,
and he argued that areas developed according to "sound planning principles"
provided the best hope for the integration of middle-class blacks into society.
Weaver's complaints were not with the use of eminent domain, but with the
focus of redevelopment officials on the clearance of minority areas and their
refusal to support integration in newly developed areas.'
64
Faced with increasing momentum in the urban redevelopment movement,
property owners and clearance area residents did not meekly accept the renewal
program. Instead, in every city that attempted condemnation, the courts were
forced to adjudicate disputes over the implementation of the program. Recent
precedents facing litigants clearly favored an expansive definition of a public
use. 65 But many of the cases had been about public housing, which benefited
only a small number of people but, nevertheless, was a government-owned
undertaking. This changed in the late 1940s and early 1950s, when at least
seventeen state courts considered the constitutionality of redevelopment
statutes.' 66 All but three of these courts upheld the right of local authorities to
condemn land and turn it over to private parties for renewal. The success of
renewal initiatives in state courts depended on a coordinated effort of real estate
interests and housing reformers. The NAREB, the National Association of
Housing Officials, the National Conference of Mayors, and other pro-
redevelopment groups provided assistance to state and local authorities, helped
to draft briefs, and submitted their own amicus curiae briefs to the courts.
Courts relied heavily on these briefs in writing their opinions, and many of
them directly appropriated the language of blight.
167
Most states had declared slum clearance a public use in public housing
cases a decade earlier, so much of the litigation over urban renewal acts
centered on two questions: Was the condemnation of blighted properties legal
in areas that were not yet slums, and was the transfer of condemned property to
163. ROBERT WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO 322 (1948).
164. Robert Weaver, Habitation With Segregation, OPPORTUNITY, June-July 1952.
165. See discussion supra pp. 25-26.
166. For state cases involving urban renewal, see REISENFELD & EASTLI.ND, supra note 110; and
Note, Eminent Domain in Urban Renewal, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1425 (1965).
167. See, for example, the cases cited in Berman v. Parker; Brief for the District of Columbia Land
Redevelopment Agency and National Capital Planning Commission, Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954) (No. 476-53); and Supplemental Brief for the District of Columbia Land Redevelopment Agency
and National Capital Planning Commission, Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (No. 476-53).
Additional cases are also discussed in Daniel Mandelker, Public Purpose in Urban Redevelopment, 28
TUL. L. REV. 96 (1953); and Note, Urban Renewal: Problems of Eliminating and Preventing Urban
Deterioration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 504 (1959).
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private parties allowed under the Public Use Clause? Renewal advocates
argued that clearance of slums and blighted areas was imperative and that a
comprehensive program was necessary to prevent further urban decline.' 68 The
courts agreed. Following the lead of renewal advocates, judicial opinions
frequently merged slums and blight into one phenomenon, ignoring the
argument that urban renewal was more about private redevelopment than about
slum clearance. To many courts, urban problems were so severe that it was
inappropriate for judges to restrict the use of condemnation to solve them. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that if urban renewal was rejected, cities
would "continue to be marred by areas which are focal centers of disease,
constitute pernicious environments for the young, and, while contributing little
to the tax income of the municipality, consume an excessive proportion of its
revenues because of the extra services required for police, fire, and other forms
of protection."' 169 The future of the city, the court concluded, rested on the
ability of government to eliminate slums and blight. Slum clearance, the court
reasoned, "certainly falls within any conception of 'public use' for nothing can
be more beneficial to the community as a whole than the clearance of [areas]
characterized by the evils described in the Urban Redevelopment Law."'
170
Considering the argument that the transfer of property to private parties
violated the Public Use Clause, courts recapitulated the argument of renewal
advocates that removal of blight was the object of redevelopment acts and that
the subsequent disposition of the property did not vitiate the public benefits
provided by clearance. That private property cannot be taken for private use "is
too well settled to require citation of authority," the Massachusetts Supreme
Court stated. "But the plaintiffs argument, we think puts the cart before the
horse.,' 171 The purpose of the act was to clear slums, and any ancillary impacts
were not significant. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed. Redevelopment
acts were "directed solely to the clearance, reconstruction and rehabilitation of
the blighted area, and after that is accomplished the public purpose is
completely realized," the court reasoned. 172 Even though private developers
were central to the program, the court concluded that it was "not the object of
the state to transfer property from one individual to another; such transfers, so
far as they may actually occur, are purely incidental to the accomplishment of
168. For a representative argument by a redevelopment authority, see Appellee's Brief, Belovsky v.
Redevelopment Auth., 54 A.2d 277 (Pa. 1947), in SUPREME COURT PAPER BOOKS (Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, 1948).
169. Belovsky v. Redevelopment Auth., 54 A.2d 277, 282 (Pa. 1947).
170. Id.
171. Papadinis v. City of Somerville, 121 N.E.2d 714, 717 (Mass. 1954) ("[W]e are of the opinion
that the main purpose of the plan is slum clearance and that the disposition of the land by sale thereafter
is incidental to that purpose. Once the public purpose contemplated by the statute has been achieved the
authority is not obliged to retain the cleared land as unproductive property.").
172. Belovsky, 54 A.2d at 282.
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the real or fundamental purpose." '173 The Illinois Supreme Court similarly held
that
when rehabilitation has been accomplished by the acquisition of the land and the
removal of the structures, and after holding and using it for some appropriate public
purpose, if there is any surplus land left, which is not needed for any of these
purposes, it may be sold, leased or exchanged as provided therein.
174
By conflating the two steps-slum clearance and redevelopment-courts made
the dramatic expansion of eminent domain powers appear unexceptional.
Not all state courts agreed that urban renewal was an appropriate
governmental function. The Supreme Court of Florida declared that the
condemnation of private homes for private commercial redevelopment was
unconstitutional and concluded that "if the municipalities can be vested with
any such power or authority, they can take over the entire field of enterprise
without limit so long as they can find a blighted area containing sufficient real
estate."'175 The Georgia Supreme Court shared this view and rejected the
attempt of the Housing Authority of Atlanta to condemn industrial and
residential property in order to create a modem industrial park. Acknowledging
that other state courts had held differently, the court stated that it could not
"subscribe to the doctrine that the power of eminent domain may be resorted
to ... every time there may be some public benefit resulting. To hold so would
be to cut the very foundation from under the sacred right to own property."'
76
South Carolina's Supreme Court also invalidated that state's urban renewal
act,177 but these were the only objections. By 1954, a large body of state law
had approved the urban renewal scheme.
Notwithstanding the Sixth Circuit's opposition to public housing and urban
renewal programs, federal precedents also favored renewal advocates. The
Supreme Court had long given wide latitude to the use of eminent domain, and
during the 1930s, the judicial underpinnings of the public use doctrine began to
collapse. Although the 1934 case of Nebbia v. New York 178 was not about the
Public Use Clause, it did set the tone for dramatic changes in Supreme Court
jurisprudence with respect to judicial review of economic regulation, thus
laying the foundation for the Berman decision. In considering New York
State's attempt to regulate the price of milk, Justice Roberts declared that the
Court's role in assessing legislative regulation of the economy was very
173. Id. at 283.
174. People ex rel. Tuohy v. City of Chicago, 68 N.E.2d 761, 766 (I11. 1946); see also David
Jeffrey Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 66 N.W.2d 362, 375 (Wis. 1954) ("The fact that the property may not
long remain in the ownership of the city does not in itself indicate that the use will not be a public use
and that the city may not be invested with the power of eminent domain in acquiring it.").
175. Adams v. Housing Auth., 60 So. 2d 663, 668-69 (Fla. 1952).
176. Housing Auth. v. Johnson, 74 S.E.2d 891, 894 (Ga. 1953). This opinion was reversed by
amendment to the Georgia State Constitution in 1954. See Mansnerus, supra note 6, at 456; Note, supra
note 166, at 1425.
177. Edens v. City of Columbia, 91 S.E.2d 280 (S.C. 1956).
178. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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limited. Prior to Nebbia, the Court required that businesses be "affected with
the public interest" to be subject to regulation. Roberts, however, declared that
the states were "free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be
deemed to promote the public welfare." 179 Nebbia had no direct impact on
Public Use Clause jurisprudence, but, by questioning the necessity for a judicial
investigation into the nature of government regulation, the case undermined the
meaning of the Public Use Clause. If all legislative enactments were presumed
to serve the public interest, then the Fifth Amendment limitations on the power
of eminent domain were empty.
In cases involving eminent domain, the Supreme Court continued to grant
wide deference to the legislature. In 1946, the Court allowed the Tennessee
Valley Authority to condemn property for an electric power project. The land
owners argued that the property was not necessary for the completion of the
power dam, but the Court stated that "it is the function of Congress to decide
what type of taking is for a public use and the agency authorized to do the
taking may do so to the full extent of its statutory authority."',80 In the aftermath
of that decision, the Court's deference to the legislature caused at least one
legal commentator to write a "requiem" for the public use doctrine, but this
scholar may have missed its passing by a decade.'
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It was in this context of expanding state approval for urban renewal and
broadened federal authority for eminent domain in other contexts that the
federal courts considered the issue of urban renewal. In 1952, the District of
Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency (DCRLA) proposed a massive
clearance project that would lead to the reconstruction of almost the entire
southwest quadrant of the city. During its twenty-year duration, this project
dislocated over 20,000 impoverished black residents and replaced their homes
with office buildings, stores, and predominantly middle-income housing. As
part of this initiative, the DCRLA condemned a department store owned by
Max Morris. All the parties agreed that his property was not "blighted," but the
agency argued that the parcel was necessary to "replan" the area.
i1 2
When Morris filed for an injunction against the taking, Judge E. Barrett
Prettyman, in a long and complex opinion for the three-judge panel that heard
the case, held that the District of Columbia's redevelopment law was
constitutional. The condemnation of property to eliminate or prevent slums,
which were "injurious to the public health, safety, morals and welfare," was a
valid purpose under the Constitution, the court ruled, and the agency could take
179. Id. at 537. For an assessment of the importance of this case, see CUSHMAN, supra note 29, at
80-81.
180. United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 551-52 (1946).
181. Note, The Public Use Doctrine: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599 (1949).
182. See Schneider v. D.C. Redev. Land Agency, 117 F. Supp. 705 (D.C. 1953); Brief for the
District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency and National Capital Planning Commission at 13-14,
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (No. 476-53); LOWE, supra note 142, at 205.
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land in such circumstances even if it was to be transferred to private parties.1
83
But the court sought to place limitations on the DCRLA's right to condemn:
"These extensions of the concept of eminent domain ... are potentially
dangerous to basic principles of our system of government. And it behooves the
courts to be alert lest currently attractive projects impinge upon fundamental
rights."'184 Prettyman concluded that the government cannot seize property
merely because it is in a slum. The condemnation was authorized only "to the
extent that the taking is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of the
asserted public purpose." 185 Interpreting the Redevelopment Act in this manner,
the court upheld the law.
The taking of "blighted" land, however, presented greater difficulties for
the court. Judge Prettyman took issue with the DCRLA's definition of blight
and declared that the condemnation of land for aesthetic purposes was not
valid. Prettyman's opinion critiqued the basic philosophy of modern planning.
Some people, he argued, "prefer single-family dwellings, like small flower
gardens, believe that a plot of ground is the place to rear children, prefer fresh
to conditioned air, sun to fluorescent light."'' 86 However, "in many circles," the
opinion continued, "such views are considered 'backward and stagnant."'1 87 He
questioned: "Is a modern apartment a better breeder of men than is the detached
or rowhouse? Is the local corner grocer a less desirable community asset than
the absentee stockholder in the national chain. . . ?"88 It was not the
government's prerogative, Prettyman declared, to determine who was correct in
such matters. "The slow, the old, the small in ambition, the devotee of the
outmoded have no less right to property than have the quick, the young, the
aggressive, and the modernistic or futuristic."'
189
The DCRLA's view of its authority, the court concluded, was overly broad.
The agency argued that it had the right to select any area for clearance as long
as a slum existed within its boundaries. Since the statute did not define blight or
explain what would constitute an appropriate land usage and allowed the
DCRLA to determine such factors on a case-by-case basis, Prettyman
concluded that the authority granted by the act would amount to an
"unreviewable power to seize and sell whole sections of the city."' 190 In so
concluding, the opinion critiqued the expansion of government power into
private life envisioned by the Redevelopment Act. The purpose of the
DCRLA's plan in Southwest Washington, the court argued, was "to create a
183. Schneider, 117 F. Supp. at 718-19.
184. Id. at 716.





190. Id. at 721.
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pleasant neighborhood," and if such a scheme were "undertaken by private
persons the project would be most laudable."' 9 1 However, "as yet the courts
have not come to call such pleasant accomplishments a public purpose." 192 To
do so would run "squarely into the right of the individual to own property and
to use it as he pleases."' 93 The rights of private property are subject only to
necessary government intervention. "One man's land cannot be seized by the
government and sold to another man merely in order that the purchaser may
build upon it a better house.... 94
Because the court held the law constitutional but placed numerous
restrictions on the DCRLA's condemnation powers, both parties appealed,
asking the Supreme Court to define the limits of the Public Use Clause. The
DCRLA desired the broadest possible interpretation of the clause, while the
appellants argued that unlimited authority would imperil the basic rights of
property owners. In its briefs to the Supreme Court, the DCRLA asserted that
the condemnation of Morris's property was necessary to prevent the further
decline of Southwest Washington. That purpose, the agency argued, was well
within the police power of Congress, which authorized the agency to "promote
the public health, safety, morals and welfare of the District of Columbia by
eliminating and preventing slums and to use eminent domain for that
purpose."' 195 The agency further asserted that prior attempts at urban renewal
had failed to revitalize cities and a comprehensive program was necessary.
"Because it was not satisfied with earlier efforts to solve the problem of...
blighted areas ... Congress discarded the piecemeal or individual structure
approach and sought to attain its goal by replanning and redevelopment [of] the
whole of substandard areas."'196 Relying on several state cases, the agency
further argued that the clearance was the "public purpose" and the subsequent
sale was "purely incident to the basic program."' 97 In the alternative, the
DCRLA argued that the public purpose continued even after the property was
no longer publicly owned because the property would be subject to strict
regulations after its sale.1
98
Morris's attorneys argued that the taking violated the Fifth Amendment.
They claimed that the program was not one of slum clearance but simply a real
estate promotion that transferred property from one private entity to another.
199




195. Brief for the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency and National Capital Planning
Commission at 19, Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (No. 476-53).
196. Id at 32.
197. Id. at 29.
198. Id. at 30 (citing Velishka v. City of Nashua, 106 A.2d 574 (N.H. 1954)).
199. Brief for Appellant Berman at 10, Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (No. 476-53).
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The agency, their brief insisted, believed that "diverse ownership and lease-
hold interests are not conducive to a sound business center and that single
ownership of the commercial area would enhance the character. ''20 While they
conceded this argument might be true, they maintained that "such pleasant
accomplishments cannot be called a public use or purpose which would
validate seizure."201 The appellants also argued that the law was void because
the renewal legislation had no "standard for the factual determination of a
blighted area.' '20 In fact, despite three pages of terms relevant to the
legislation, the District's Urban Renewal Act had no definition of blight. In
response, the redevelopment advocates argued that the standards were
delineated by the terms themselves. "Adequate and specific standards," argued
the DCRLA, "are set out in the following language: 'technological and
sociological changes,' 'obsolete lay-out,' 'substandard and blighted areas,' ...
'comprehensive planning and replanning,' 'lack of sanitary facilities,
ventilation or light,' 'delapidation, overcrowding, faulty interior
arrangements.'
20 3
Although the parties debated in detail the technical definition of blight and
the legal rationale for urban renewal efforts, none of the briefs in the Berman
case even mentioned the fact that the project would uproot thousands of poor
blacks and would reshape Washington's racial landscape. The fact that both
parties ignored this aspect of the case is particularly poignant because Berman
was argued just four months after the Supreme Court's monumental declaration
on American race relations in Brown v. Board of Education.204 Brown began an
era in which the Court rewrote much of the constitutional jurisprudence
regarding individual rights. Berman was a minor case in the context of these
major changes to American law, and it therefore receives little attention in
analyses of the Warren Court.20 5 But the two cases were intimately related. The
urban renewal program that the Court approved allowed cities to redistribute
their populations, increasing residential segregation and thereby making the
integration of schools far more difficult.
Justice William 0. Douglas did make note of the racial makeup of the
population in the renewal district, but he did not attach any significance to that
fact. After noting that the renewal area was seriously deteriorated (64.3% of the
dwellings were beyond repair, 57.8% had outside toilets, 60.3% had no baths,
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 13.
203. Brief for Renah F. Camalier and Louis W. Prentiss, Commissioners of the District of
Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency at 9, Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (No. 476-53).
204. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown was decided in May of 1954 while Berman was argued in
September.
205. Lucas Powe, for example, does not cite the case in his political history of the Warren Court.
See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000).
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and 83.8% lacked central heating) as well as 97.5% "Negroes," the Court
unanimously approved the condemnation and granted redevelopment
authorities broad discretion for urban renewal.2 °6 The authority bestowed by the
police power of Congress as administrator of the District, Douglas asserted, "is
essentially the product of legislative determinations addressed to the purposes
of government, purposes neither abstractly nor historically capable of complete
definition. Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature
has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh
conclusive."
20 7
Public safety and health are well within the police power, Douglas stated,
and the urban renewal program sought to improve them. Directly appropriating
the language of planners, he argued that
miserable and disreputable housing conditions do more than spread disease and
crime and immorality. They may also suffocate the spirit by reducing the people
who live there to the status of cattle.... They may also be an ugly sore, a blight on
the community which robs it of charm.... The misery of housing may despoil a
208community as an open sewer may ruin a river.
Douglas upbraided the lower court for substituting its policy preferences for
those of the legislature and declared that Congress has the authority to
"determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious
as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.,, 219 If
democratically elected officials decide that such improvements are worthy,
Douglas stated, there is "nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the
way.,
210
Slums and blighted areas were a threat to the health of cities, and both were
within the purview of urban renewal. "The experts," Douglas stated,
concluded that if the community were to be healthy, if it were not to revert again to
a blighted or slum area, as though possessed of a congenital disease, the area must
be planned as a whole .... to eliminate the conditions that cause slums-the
overcrowding of dwellings, the lack oflFarks... the lack of light and air, the
presence of outmoded street patterns ....
Douglas agreed that the commission had the authority to include a large area in
the renewal district so as to avoid the "piecemeal approach." The "public
purpose" having been decided, the means of executing the project were "for the
Congress and Congress alone to determine." 21 2 Therefore, the Court concluded,
it was within Congress' authority to decide that the "public end may be as well
206. Berman, 348 U.S. at 30, 36.
207. Id. at 32.
208. Id. at 32-33.
209. Id. at 33.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 34.
212. Id. at 33.
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or better served through an agency of private enterprise .... ,,213
Douglas also rejected the argument that the standards for determining the
redevelopment area were inadequate for it was, he argued, "the need of the area
as a whole which Congress" addressed and the goal of eliminating "not only
slums" but "also the blighted areas that tend to produce slums" was an
acceptable delegation of authority. 214 In conclusion, the Court declared, the
rights of property owners were "satisfied when they receive that just
compensation which the Fifth Amendment exacts as the price of the taking. 2 15
That Douglas would take such a strong position in support of the urban
renewal program is unremarkable. Douglas and the rest of the Court viewed
urban renewal as a government initiative to improve the economic and social
conditions of cities. By the time Berman was argued, the Court had a more than
twenty-year record of restraint in considering such measures. 2 16 Berman was
consistent with the New Deal Court's philosophy that legislatures were best
suited to determine the appropriate uses of government power in the area of
economic regulation. The DCRLA and other redevelopment agencies, run by
planning experts, would apply professional standards to determine which areas
required redevelopment and would implement the program in an equitable
fashion for the benefit of the city.
The irony is that, at the same time it was deciding Berman, the Court was
deciding Brown, which reflects a distrust of government (particularly local
government) to protect the interests of minority groups and to treat all citizens
equally. Douglas's opinion in Berman reflects a faith in the political system's
ability to operate in a non-discriminatory manner.217 Urban renewal, however,
was an economic development program with profound racial implications that
were ignored by all the parties to the litigation. The reality of urban renewal
was that redevelopment was used to reshape the racial and economic geography
of cities. Such was the case in Southwest Washington where, of the 5,900 units
of housing that were constructed on the site, only 310 could be classified as
213. Id. at33-34.
214. Id. at35.
215. Id. at 36.
216. In United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1937), the Court stated that it would
grant legislatures wide latitude in reviewing economic regulation. Justice Stone stated that "regulatory
legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless
... it is of such character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the legislators." 304 U.S. at 152. Douglas's approach to the urban renewal
program is consistent with Carolene Products. On the Court's jurisprudence regarding economic
regulation, see CUSHMAN, supra note 29; GILLMAN, supra note 29, at 200-05; and Martin Shapiro, The
Supreme Court's "'Return" to Economic Regulation, in 1 STUDIES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT 91 (Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek eds., 1986).
217. This is not to argue that the Court has not considered the discriminatory impact of regulatory
programs. The Court has maintained its authority to review administrative determinations for fairness.
See Shapiro, supra note 216, at 138-39. The Court's increasing attention to administrative law in the
past half century is evidence of this effort. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND PROCESS ch. 7 (3d ed. 1999).
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218affordable to the former residents of the area. By the 1960s, the formerly
black neighborhood was majority white. 219
The rhetoric of blight enabled urban elites to craft and implement these
broad powers of condemnation. In the decade following Berman, urban renewal
programs uprooted hundreds of thousands of people, disrupted fragile urban
neighborhoods, and helped entrench racial segregation in the inner city. Racial
motivations were often submerged under the labels of "slum clearance" or
"neighborhood revitalization," but a primary goal of postwar urban renewal
was to channel minority settlement into certain areas and to uproot minority
communities in other areas. In cities across the country, urban renewal came to
be known as "Negro removal."220
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Berman affected a dramatic expansion in
the government's powers of eminent domain and provided judicial legitimation
for urban renewal efforts. Throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, American
cities undertook massive redevelopment projects that cleared large areas
surrounding the central business district. These projects resulted in the
dislocation of more than one million people. 221 The majority of these families
were minorities. Across the nation, inner city neighborhoods were designated
as blighted, properties condemned, and land turned over to private parties.
Berman, however, was a pyrrhic victory for renewal advocates because the
urban renewal program came under attack only a few years after the ruling. By
the early 1960s, critics were questioning the basic philosophy of urban renewal.
They argued that, despite the investment of billions of dollars, cities had not
been revitalized, and they complained that the dislocation caused by the
program had resulted in the creation of more slums. The movement against
urban renewal was led by Jane Jacobs, whose best-selling critique of urban
redevelopment, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, argued that the
diversity of cities was central to their survival. Jacobs assailed principles of
modern planning and argued that most redevelopment projects did "not rest
218. See GILLETTE, supra note 159, at 163-64.
219. See id. at 164. For a discussion of the Berman opinion as part of Douglas's jurisprudence, see
VERN COUNTRYMAN, THE JUDICIAL RECORD OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 376-77 (1974). On
Douglas's views on civil rights, see Drew S. Days III, Justice William 0. Douglas and Civil Rights, in
"HE SHALL NOT PASS THIS WAY AGAIN": THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 109-19
(Stephen L. Wasby ed., 1990).
220. See HALPERN, supra note 74, at 68-69; DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON,
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 56 (1993).
221. No report has documented the exact number of people dislocated from urban renewal, but a
1969 report by the National Commission on Urban Problems estimated that the highway program
uprooted 32,400 families a year during the early 1960s. Raymond A. Mohl, Planned Destruction: The
Interstates and Central City Housing, in FROM TENEMENTS TO THE TAYLOR HOMES 227 (John Bauman
et al. eds., 2000).
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soundly on reasoned investment of public tax subsidies, as urban renewal
theory proclaims, but on vast involuntary subsidies wrought out of helpless site
victims.
222
By the mid-1960s, critics from across the political spectrum declared the
urban renewal program a prime example of government overreaching. Liberals
argued that it exacerbated racial discrimination, 3 while conservatives stated
that it wasted government resources and interfered with the private market.
224
The rise of the historic preservation movement also put a harsh light on large-
scale demolition projects that destroyed important landmarks like New York's
Pennsylvania Station. As a result of these critiques, the federal urban renewal
program was greatly curtailed, and urban planners became increasingly
circumspect about their ability to create a wholly modem city.225 The dream of
erasing the antiquated city and building a completely modem replacement is no
longer the planning profession's primary focus. 226
Condemnation, however, remains a powerful tool of government policy. In
recent decades, state and local governments have undertaken a wide variety of
initiatives that transferred condemned property to private entities in the name of
housing, commercial, or industrial development, and the urban redevelopment
corporations created in the 1940s continue to wield great power over city land
use. In light of past failures, private interests and government bodies are more
circumspect in promoting the benefits of eminent domain. Instead of promising
to rebuild cities, they focus on more practical aspects such as job creation. The
reason for using the power of condemnation-the desire to secure coveted
property without private market negotiations-however, remains the same.
227
The most famous eminent domain case of the last two decades involved the
construction of a General Motors plant in Detroit. The project, in the city's
racially-diverse, working-class neighborhood of Poletown (which all parties
agreed was not blighted), required the acquisition and clearance of a site that
had over 1,000 buildings housing more than 4,200 people. In contesting the use
of eminent domain, neighborhood residents faced not only General Motors but
the city's African-American mayor and all of the area's major labor
222. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 5 (1993).
223. See GREER, supra note 10; URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY, supra
note 11.
224. See MARTIN ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF URBAN
RENEWAL, 1949-1962 (1964).
225. Criticisms of urban renewal led to many reforms of the condemnation process to protect the
interests of property owners and tenants. On changes in the urban renewal program and the planning
profession, see THOMAS, supra note 12, at 179-84. The urban renewal program was terminated by the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (1994).
226. See THOMAS, supra note 12, at 180-81.
227. William Nelson, in his analysis of condemnation in New York City, argues that it has been a
particularly effective means to subsidize private development projects that receives little public
attention. See NELSON, supra note 48, at 260-61. On debates over urban development, see BERNARD J.
FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN DOWNTOWN, INC.: How AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES (1989).
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organizations and non-profit institutions. Both government and labor leaders
desperately wanted the project, which they hoped would stem the flood of job
loss in the city. To keep General Motors from building elsewhere, the city spent
over $200 million to acquire and prepare the property, which it sold to the
company for $8 million.228
The residents' fight against condemnation went all the way to the Supreme
Court of Michigan, which approved the redevelopment plan.2 2 9 Relying on
Berman, the court declared that it would not restrict the ability of state and
local government to respond to the economic problems facing the city. If the
legislature concluded that government support for this kind of economic growth
was important, the public use requirement was met.230 "The power of eminent
domain is to be used in this instance primarily to accomplish the essential
public purposes of alleviating unemployment and revitalizing the economic
base of the community. The benefit to a private interest is merely incidental,"
231the court ruled. Other courts have granted similar deference to governmental
programs that involve the transfer of land to private developers.
232
The concept of blight remains integral to redevelopment efforts. While
many courts have expanded the Public Use Clause to encompass any initiative
that brings economic growth, most states still require that a redevelopment
agency determine that an area is blighted before condemnation can occur.233
Legislatures have created long lists of criteria that redevelopment agencies are
required to use to determine whether an area is blighted. These criteria,
however, remain vague and subject to broad interpretation by redevelopment
authorities, to which courts have granted great deference.
234
The United States Supreme Court has also further enunciated its principle
of broad deference to legislative determinations of public use. In 1984, the
228. The Poletown project is examined in THOMAS, supra note 12, at 161-66; Kochan, supra note
14, at 69-72; and Mansnerus, supra note 6, at 418-21.
229. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
230. Id. at 459.
231. Id. Note the similarity of the Poletown court's reasoning with the state cases discussed in
footnotes 171-174 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 190 N.E.2d 402 (N.Y. 1963)
(approving the condemnation of private businesses to build the World Trade Center); Karesh v. City
Council, 247 S.E.2d 342 (S.C. 1978) (allowing condemnation for convention center and garage); Hogue
v. Port of Seattle, 341 P.2d 171 (Wash. 1959) (approving condemnation of agricultural lands for private
port facility); see also Mansnerus, supra note 6, at 418 n.43, 421 n.65 (citing additional cases). Thomas
Merrill argues that state courts have been more skeptical about condemnation programs than federal
courts. Merrill, supra note 14, at 96-97. In a survey of over 200 cases decided between 1954 and 1986,
Merrill found that state courts rejected a condemnation on the basis that it was not a public use in fifteen
percent of the cases. See, e.g., Baycol Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1975)
(rejecting attempt to condemn property for shopping mall).
233. For an examination of current definitions of blight, see Hudson Hayes Luce, The Meaning of
Blight: A Survey of Statutory and Case Law, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 389 (2000).
234. Mansnerus, supra note 6, at 426. Many courts have declared that they will approve blight
designations "absent fraud or abuse." Others impose a standard of "clear error." Luce, supra note 233, at
409-13.
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Court approved a program by the state of Hawaii to condemn the property of
large landholders and sell it to other residents. 235 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
ruled that the public use requirement was "coterminous with the scope of the
sovereign's police powers" and further stated that the Court would accept any
use of eminent domain that was "rationally related to conceivable public
purposes. ' 236 The Supreme Court's restraint in this area has led many
commentators to complain that the Court has abdicated its responsibility to
protect property owners from government abuse.237 Legal scholar Richard
Epstein has argued that the Court has entirely read the phrase "public use" out
of the Fifth Amendment.
238
In response to the courts' continued deference to legislative determinations
of public use, scholars and legal advocates have given increased attention to the
Public Use Clause in the past decade. Several recent law journal articles have
critiqued the current interpretations of the doctrine. These scholars argue that
eminent domain is used by "rent seeking" groups that want to avoid private
market negotiations. They also claim that eminent domain is abused by public
authorities that are controlled by private developers, and they argue for a
stricter application of the Clause.239
Legal advocates have also taken an increasing interest in the use of eminent
domain. The Institute for Justice, based in Washington, D.C., has established an
Eminent Domain Law Project that assists clients fighting the condemnation of
their properties. The organization has taken on cases in several states, including
New York, New Jersey, New Mexico, Mississippi, and Connecticut,
representing clients such as a woman fighting the condemnation of her Atlantic
City home for a casino owned by Donald Trump and a group of African-
American farmers battling the efforts of the state of Mississippi to condemn
240their property for the construction of an automobile plant. In the Atlantic
City case, the condemnees succeeded in convincing the trial judge that the
transfer of their property to Trump Casino violated the Public Use Clause.24'
235. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
236. Id. at 240, 241.
237. Kochan, supra note 14, at 115; Mansnerus, supra note 6, at 424.
238. EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 161-63.
239. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 14, at 306 (suggesting that courts use "strict scrutiny" in assessing
the use of eminent domain); Kochan, supra note 14, at 110-11 (proposing the creation of "political
filters" to increase the cost to private parties of using condemnation to acquire property); Mansnerus,
supra note 6, at 444 (arguing for a requirement of "true rational basis," by which courts would review
uses of eminent domain). But see Merrill, supra note 14, which concludes that state courts have done a
fairly good job of balancing interests in eminent domain cases.
240. Inst. for Just., Litigation Backgrounder, Saving the Skin of Property Owners in Connecticut
(2001); David Firestone, Black Families Resist Mississippi Land Push, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2001, at
A20; Laura Mansnerus, There Stays the Hotel and the Neighborhood, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2000, § 1, at
21.
241. Casino Redev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998); David M.
Herszenhom, Widowed Homeowner Foils Trump inAtlantic City, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1998, at B1.
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The judge's decision, however, rested on defects in the condemnation process
and did not attempt to reinterpret the Public Use Clause. Therefore, while the
anti-eminent domain effort has increased the cost of condemnation to specific
developers and delayed the process in several cases, the initiative has yet to
significantly alter interpretations of the Public Use Clause. These efforts have,
however, raised public attention to the issue of condemnation, and increased
political opposition to eminent domain has helped defeat recent urban
242redevelopment initiatives in Baltimore and Pittsburgh.
American cities have witnessed dramatic political and demographic
changes since the 1950s. African-American mayors lead many urban areas, and
blacks and other minorities play a major role in the political structure of most
large cities. The housing shortages that most cities experienced in the post-
World War II era are no longer a concern. Instead, policy-makers face a glut of
abandoned, vacant buildings. Urban policies that supported segregation in the
1940s and 1950s are a fait accompli in the modem era, and many cities have
reached what sociologists call "hyper-segregation." 243 In this context, urban
redevelopment policies have a very different impact on city residents.
Community members are generally more concerned with the lack of
government involvement than with fears of eminent domain.
Policymakers continue to argue that land clearance is crucial to the rebirth
of the city, and the rhetoric of blight continues to shape urban policy. The city
of Philadelphia, for example, is currently considering a major "Neighborhood
Transformation Initiative," which aims to clear large areas of the city's most
dilapidated housing in the hope that the cleared land will attract private
development. While the city's African-American mayor never uses the term,
Philadelphia's newspapers make constant reference to the "blight problem,"
and several articles have discussed the need to stop the disease of blight before
it afflicts other neighborhoods. 244 In Detroit, the clearance of the city's more
than 10,000 abandoned structures has brought about greater use of the city's
eminent domain powers. Community activists have argued that government
condemnation is crucial to the solution of this problem. "Blight is like a
cancer," argued one activist in the summer of 2002. "Our theory has been we
can eliminate it before it spreads."
245
In the abstract, the goals of these initiatives are widely accepted and
praised. The taking of fire-ravaged buildings that serve only to shelter drug
242. David Nitkin & Joe Nawrozki, Condemnation Bill Defeated: Baltimore County Plan to Renew
East Side Loses by 2 to 1, BALT. SUN, Nov. 8, 2000, at 1A; James Zambroski, Revitalization Plan Back
to Square One, PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REv., Nov. 23, 2000.
243. On the increasing segregation of American cities, see MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 220.
244. See, e.g., Jennifer Lin, Keeping Blight at Bay, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 25, 2001, at A24;
Monica Yant Kinney, Growing a Leafy Antidote to Decay, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 29, 2001, at B1.
245. Jodi Wilgoren, Detroit Urban Renewal Without the Renewal, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2002, § 1, at
10.
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dealers does not elicit much sympathy. But most city neighborhoods do not
present such an easy case as Detroit. In many poor areas, residents struggle to
build community in the midst of abandonment. Blight, while sometimes
obvious, remains in the eye of the beholder. Only when specific properties are
identified for redevelopment will the public benefits of renewal meet the
resistance of property owners and renters. While land in urban areas may be
less valuable today than it was fifty years ago, the competition over the
property within American cities will continue to implicate and shape the public
use doctrine.
